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ABSTRACT 
This paper is about the presumption of innocence under anti-terrorism Jaws 
and is undertaken in a comparative manner, examining the laws of Malaysia, and 
England and Wales, hence, the influence ofEnglish common law in our legal system. 
The presumption of innocence is regarded as the cornerstone of the criminal justice 
system and operates throughout the criminal process. Thus, it is observed that the 
right to be presumed innocent f01ms an effective theoretical safeguard which reflects 
due process of Jaw. 
In this research, upon examining the presumption of innocence under anti-
terrorism Jaws, it is observed that this pillar of criminal justice system is curtailed 
extensively under such laws. The study shows that preventive detention under anti-
terrorism laws curtail the rights of an accused person to a fair trial. Thus, in the 
absence of an opportunity to prove innocence in a court of law, what entails is 
potential abuse of power by enforcement authorities disregarding adherence to 
procedural rights, specifically the right to counsel. This is further reflected as in most 
cases, detainees under such laws are tortured and abused for an alleged offence based 
on suspicion. Hence, the role of the judiciary is emphasised, as they are regarded as 
bulwark of fundamental liberties. The question of deterrnjning guilt should not be left 
at the hands of the Executive, but on the safe hands ofthe Court. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Overview 
This paper attempts to examine the doctrine of the presumption of i1mocence 
under anti-terrorism Jaws in a comparative aptitude of the legal systems of Malaysia, 
and England and Wales. The comparative study is essential in order to identify and 
highlight the divergence and drawbacks of the aforesaid legal systems under study, 
hence, the long standing Commonwealth relationship between Malaysia and England 
and Wales. 1 
The presumption of innocence is found in every modern democratic society 
and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law. 2 
The right to be presumed innocent is accorded to an accused person throughout the 
criminal process and therefore, it operates at both pre-trial and trial stages. 
Further Part II of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia (hereinafter the 
'Federal Constitution') is an important declaration and instrument of human rights in 
Malaysia. The rights accorded under the Federal Constitution enable an accused 
person to challenge actions of the State if they fail to match the standards set by it. 
The membership of Malaysia in the United Nations is also a proclamation of its desire 
to achieve the promotion ofuniversal respect for and observance of human rights. 3 
Malaysia, as one of the former colonies of Britain and having obtained independence from the latter, 
adopted a Westminster model, thereby incorporating to some extent, constitutional practices 
established by the English legal system. For further reading see: Tan, Yeo & Lee's, Constitutional 
law in Malaysia & Singapore (2"d ed). Kevin YL Tan, Thio Li-ann, Butterworths Asia ( 1997) at pp. 
36-55 
2 Coffin v United States 156 U.S. 432, 453 [1895] 
3 In promoting and enhancing the protection of such rights, a Human Rights Commission was set up in 
1999 under the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 (Act 597). The Act provides for the 
establishment of the said Commission, setting out powers and functions of the Commission for the 
protection and promotion of human rights in Malaysia. 
However, with the tremendous expansion of State powers, it seems evident 
that the rights of the accused person are increasingly being impinged. So much so, 
that the idea of a ' human rights culture' promugalated 50 years ago seems depraved. 
The Malaysian Parliament over the years had passed various laws like the Internal 
Security Act 1960 (hereinafter the '!SA 1960 '), 4 the Emergency (Public Order and 
Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 (hereinafter the 'EO 1969'),5 and the 
Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 (hereinafter the 'DDA-
SPM 1985 ')6 which, has significantly challenged the fundamental liberties of an 
accused person. 
Apart from the !SA 1960, although the EO 1969 and the DDA-SPM 1985 was 
enacted to counter different problems,7 nevertheless, both empower indefinite 
detention, akin to powers under the !SA 1960.8 Such laws are therefore open for 
potential abuse especially with the police in carrying out their investigation. In the 
absence of effective safeguards,9 there is risk of torture or ill treatment of suspects 
during detention. 10 But the laws are there and the justification is that they are 
necessary for the security and welfare of the society. 
4 See Chapter 4: Anti-Terrorism Laws in Malaysia 
5 The EO /969 was issued for the purpose of restoring peace and order in the aftermath of the state of 
emergency proclaimed in the 1969 racial riots . Anmesty International, Malaysia: Towards Human 
Rights-Based Policing, 7111 April2005 at p. 10 
(http ://web .anmesty. org/1 ibrary/index/ENGASA2800 12005) 
6 !d. 11 , The DDA-SPM 1985 was passed pursuant to Article 149 of the Federal Constitution, which 
empowers the police officer to arrest without warrant any person suspected of any form of 
invo lvement in drugs trafficking. 
7 !bid 
8 These laws empower the police to detain any suspect for up to 60 days and thereafter the Minister can 
issue a two year detention order, renewable indefinitely based on the findings of the police. 
9 Under the EO 1969, the police are not required to obtain a remand detention order from a magistrate, 
thus, effectively curtailing judicial safeguard. Further, under the DDA-SPM /985, the effectiveness 
of the Inquiry Officer's role is doubted and there are other effective drug laws that a suspect can be 
charged with, whjch include; the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (Act 234, Revised 1980) and the 
Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 1984 (Act A596). 
2 
This paper will discuss on the presumption of innocence and articulate that 
anti-terrorism laws have significantly eroded this presumption of innocence. These 
laws are focused at preventing future conduct rather than to detain until trial or to 
punish or correct an offence which has already been comrnitted. 11 Thus, such laws 
change the way as to how criminal law should be administered; that is in accordance 
to credible admission of evidence, upon the satisfaction of a court of law beyond 
reasonable doubt, and not based on reasonable suspicion. 12 
Although acts of terrorism should be outright condemned, States have legal 
obligation to take effective measures to counter such acts, which must be done, in 
accordance to legal norms and nothing short should suffice as liberties of individuals 
are at stake. Therefore, the purpose of undertaking this research is to emphasize that 
the presumption of innocence should not be compromised under anti-terrorism laws. 
It is difficult to ascertain the extent of the legitimacy of such laws, as it was 
encountered that the nature and the application of anti-terrorism laws evolve during 
time. Terrorism itself is broadly defined as legislators find it futile to have one 
universal accepted definition. We cannot ignore against the fact that the root of 
ten·orism involves variables that may include political strategies, sensitivity of 
religion, and poverty among others. Therefore, the law has a mounting task to balance 
the interest to protect the safety of the nation and the interest of an accused person. 
10 Amnesty Intemational, Loc. Cit. 
11 Steven Greer, Preventive Detention and Public Security-Towards a General Model, at p. 25. 
(Andrew Harding & John Hatchard, Preventive Detention & Security Law. A Comparative Study: 
International Studies in Human Rights. Volume 31. Martinus NijhoffPublishers) 
12 Andrew Harding & John Hatchard, Preventive Detention & Security Law. A Comparative Study: 
International Studies in Human Rights. Volume 31. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, at p 6 
3 
1.1 Objectives and Significance of the Study 
It is submitted that the objective of this research is to contribute to the 
knowledge and better understanding of the presumption of innocence under anti-
terrorism laws. Hence, this study would enable us to question the implication of 
preventive detention and the ensuing denial of the right to counsel in light of the right 
to be presumed innocent 
1.2 Research Methodology 
The research is conducted in a comparative manner of the laws of Malaysia, 
and England and Wales. Both these countries to some extent, share a common 
criminal justice system premised on a Westminster model. The research has primarily 
been carried out in the Law Libraries in Malaysia, pa1iicularly at the University 
Malaya, which has provided valuable information and materials pertaining to the area 
of study. Thus, the data collections are generally based on text books, joumals, 
documents, other written materials, and intemet sources. 
1.3 Organisation of the Chapters 
The chapter of this research would be organised as below: 
1.3.1 Chapter one 
This chapter deals with matters encountered in the process of compiling and 
writing this project paper, particularly the scope of study, analysis of the central issues 
and the central theme of the aforesaid project paper 
4 
1.3.2 Chapter two 
This chapter will provide a non-exhaustive perspective of the presumption of 
innocence. It will be emphasised that the presumption of innocence is regarded as the 
ultimate safeguard offered to suspects which, if not observed may lead to potential 
miscarriage of justice. Thus, the presumption of innocence is regarded as a universal 
concept which is reflected in the criminal justice system. The application of which 
wi ll be examined in the context of the legal systems of Malaysia, and England and 
Wales, together with other selected jurisdiction. 
1.3.3 Chapter three 
This chapter will demonstrate how preventive detention under anti-terrorism 
laws erodes the presumption of innocence. Under these laws an accused person on 
suspicion of links to 'terrorism' may be held without any criminal charge or trial and 
in the course of being detained for the said alleged activity, denied access to legal 
counsel. Such detention often disregard due process of law, which, is a fundamental 
principle in the Federal Constitution as there is no opportunity at all for a detainee to 
prove his innocence as trial in a court of law is never envisaged. 
1.3.4 Chapter four 
This chapter examines the terrorism laws in Malaysia, with specific reference 
to the !SA I 960. The !SA I 960 empowers police authorities to detain a person without 
any warrant of arrest for a period of up to 60 days. It also empowers the Executive to 
order a detention for a period not exceeding two years but renewable, thereafter, 
indefinitely. The exercise of powers under the !SA I960 may amount to violation of 
fundamental rights effecting the presumption of innocence enshrined in the Federal 
Constitution pursuant to Article 5(1) which ensures that no person is deprived of his 
life or personal liberty, save in accordance with law. Further, the accused being 
5 
detained under such circumstances may be denied of his right to counsel which 
bearing in mind is an enshrined right accorded under Article 5(3) of the Federal 
Constitution. 
1.3.5 Chapter five 
This chapter deals with ten·orism laws in England and Wales, specifically in 
relation to the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (hereinafter the 'A TCSA 
2001 ') and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (hereinafter the 'PTA 2005 ') .13 The 
initiation of the ATCSA 2001 was to enhance the scope of powers of the Police to 
investigate and prevent terrorist activity, but most of all; the ATCSA 2001 introduced 
indefinite detention only applying to non-UK nationals. The PTA 2005 instituted 
control orders which can be imposed against any terrorist suspect, whether an UK 
national or a non-UK national, or whether the terrorist activity is intemational or 
domestic. Therefore these provisions under the ATCSA 2001 and the PTA 2005 may 
infringe the presumption of innocence. 
1.3.6 Chapter six 
This chapter will conclude by examining the role of the judiciary as protectors 
of individual rights and libetiies. However, in Malaysia this is short-lived, as the 
Govemment over the years had made significant amendments to the !SA 1960 thereby 
completely removing judicial safeguards. However, this was not the only reason for 
the existing predicament, as lack of sound judicial decision was also a contributory 
factor. 
Some fom1 of reforms is proposed along the passages which include, inter alia, 
the creation of a Constitutional Court to hear matters concerning fundamental rights. 
Reform is urgently needed in this area as what we do not like to see is the long hands 
6 
of the executive acting without due regard to the law. This is where it is reiterated that 
the role of the judiciary becomes imperative above all in protecting the rights of the 
accused from both arbitrary Executive action and actions of law enforcement 
agencies. Herein lies the duty of the court to be the guardian of the Constitution and 
not otherwise a slave to executive powers. 
1.4 Conclusion 
It is reiterated that this paper is undertaken in a comparative manner, examining the 
significance of the presumption of innocence under anti-terrorism laws of Malaysia, 
and England and Wales. In having laid the relevant chapters, we now examine the 
presumption of innocence. 
13 Apart from the aforesaid, other prevailing terrorism laws would include the Terrorism Act 2000 and 
the proposed Terrorism Bill 2005. Note: for our present discussion only the ATCSA 2001 and the 
PTA 2005 is relevant. 
7 
CHAPTER2 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
2.0 Introduction 
The right to be presumed innocent has become analogues with the 
Blackstonean maxims that 'it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one 
innocent suffer. '14 In fact this principle uncovers that under criminal law a person is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty. It follows, therefore, that the burden of 
proving the defendant's guilt lies on the prosecution to proofbeyond reasonable doubt 
the necessary elements of crime; that is having to prove that the accused committed 
the act and having done so with the requisite criminal intent. 15Thus, the presumption 
of innocence requires that any imputation of guilt is only to be detennined upon 
submission of evidence presented in a court of law. 
However, this right to be presumed innocent is not only confined to trial stage 
but it also extends to pre-trial stage. The fundamental right to be presumed im1ocent 
as Dworkin contends, is based on two rights that fom1 the basis of presumption of 
im1ocence; the right to procedures that place a proper valuation on moral harms and, 
second, the right to consistent treatment throughout the criminal justice 
system. 16Thus, the presumption of innocence is regarded, as the cornerstone of the 
administration of criminal justice system that to deny the very subsistence is to 
ultimately deny the very polestar that fashions due process of the law. 17 Due process 
embraces procedural and theoretical safeguards within the criminal process so as to 
ensure prevention and elimination of mistakes to the extent possible and as Packer 
14 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4, of Public Wrongs (1769) , 352. 
15 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 
16 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) at p. 13 
17 Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction ( 1978) Stanford University Press ( 1978) at p. 
161 
8 
contends, due process resembles a factory that has to devote a substantial part of its 
input to quality contro1. 18 
Thus, presumption of i1mocence IS regarded as the ultimate theoretical 
safeguard 19 offered to suspects, which, if not observed may lead to potential 
miscarriage of justice.Z0 The presumption of innocence is an all-conquering right that 
serves to protect an accused person in granting them the absolute right to be 
summoned, to have their case heard in an open court, to have legal counsel, to have 
their sentence pronounced publicly, and to present evidence in their defence. Thus, 
the maxim extends to mean, "no one, absolutely no one, can be denied a trial under 
any circumstances" and that everyone, absolutely everyone, had the right to conduct a 
vigorous, thorough defence. 21 Therefore, the notion of innocent until proven guilty is 
a widely accepted principle of due process of law, which is inherent in most legal 
systems. 
2.1 The Universality of the Presumption of Innocence 
The presumption of innocence is accorded universal recognition by virtue of 
Article 11 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (hereinafter the 
'UDHR 1948 '), which reads: 
"Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which 
he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. " 
18 !d. 164-165 
19 Procedural safeguards on the other hand would include among others, caution statements; remand 
period; the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence and the right to counsel 
20 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (2"d ed., 2000) Butterworth, at p. 10 
9 
The presumption of innocence is also reflected in Article 6 (2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 1951 (hereinafter the 'Convention') which is binding on 
all members of the Council of Europe, including all Member States of the European 
Community. The provision reads that: 
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law". 
In Murray v United Kingdom ,22 the European Court of Human Rights stated clearly 
that there can be no doubt that the right to remain silent under police questioning and 
the privilege against self-incrimination lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure 
under Article 6 of the Convention . Such protection against improper compulsion by 
the authorities can avoid miscarriage of justice and ultimately secure the aims of 
Article 6 of the Convention. 23 In fact such treaties when incorporated into domestic 
law make significant change to the legal system ofMember States. 
Lord Hope in R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene, 24 in regards to England and Wales 
incorporating Convention rights into domestic law, states that the said incorporation 
will subject the entire legal system to a fundamental process of review and, where 
necessary, reform by the judiciary.25 Thus, the presumption of innocence is regarded 
as a customary universal concept accorded to an accused person. 
21 Kenneth Pennington, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: The Origins of a Legal Maxim. Papal Justice 
and Due Process. Published in A E1mio Cortese, 3 Volumes. Roma: II Cigno Galileo Galilei Edizioni 
(2001) 
22 
[ 1996] EHRR 29 
23 /d. 45 
24 [1999] 3 WLR 972 
25 Id 838, fmther Lord Bingham held that sections 1 6A and 168 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(Tempormy Provisions) 1989 which places the burden on the accused, blatantly undermines the 
principle of the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) ofthe Convention . 
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2.2 The Presumption of Innocence an Effective Safeguard under Ordinary Laws 
As aforementioned, the presumption of innocence is an effective safeguard 
offered to suspects, which ensures the observance of due process of law. This is well 
reflected under ordinary laws which provide comprehensive safeguards to an accused 
person throughout the criminal process. 
The Criminal Procedure Code,26(hereinafter the 'CPC') provides effective 
safeguards which reflect the presumption of innocence and in particular section 
173(m) and 182A of the CPC, which provides that the prosecution shall bear the 
burden of proving the accused persons guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Further section 
15 of the CPC provides the mode of arrest, 27 in which case it does not matter if the 
arrest is actual or constructive,28 so long as caution is administered29 under section 
113 of the CPC.30 The significance of failure to administer a caution31 or the caution 
not being administered in fu11 32 renders the statement inadmissible. 
Another important safeguard is reflected under section 28(1) of the CPC 
which provides that a police officer who makes an arrest shall, without unnecessary 
delay and subject to the provisions relating to bail or previous release take or send the 
person arrested before a magistrate's court, which is supported under Article 5(4) of 
26 (Act 593 Rev. 1999) 
27 According to subsection (1 ), where in making an arrest the police officer or other person making the 
same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested unless there is a submission 
to the custody by word or action. 
28 In Jayaraman & Ors v PP [ 1982] 2 M.L.J. 306, the Federal Court held that there should be an actual 
arrest. However in the following cases of Kang Ho Soh [1992] 1 M.L.J. 360 and Shee Chin Wah 
[1998}5 M.L.J. 429, both Shankar J and Suriyadi J agree that the distinction between actual and 
constructive arrest is not much he lpful. 
29 Mimi Kamariah Majid, Criminal Procedure in Malaysia (Third ed, 1999) University of Malaya 
Press, at p. 67 
30 According to subsection(!) (a) (ii) where in the case of a statement made by the person after his 
arrest, unless the court is satisfied that a caution was administered to him in the following words or 
words to the like effect: "ft is my duty to warn you that you are not obliged to say any thing or to 
answer any question, but any thing you say, whether in answer to a question or not, may be given in 
evidence. " However in Chan Kim Choi v PP [1989] 1 M.L.J. 404 it was held that if an arrest is not 
made and subsequently a statement is tendered, then it does not warrant a caution under the aforesaid 
section 1/3 but a warning under section 112 of the CPC suffice. 
31 See Krishnan v PP [1987] I M.L.J. 292 
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the FederaL Constitution. 33 Therefore, any detention after the first twenty-four hours 
may only be ordered by the magistrate pursuant to section 117 of the CPC. 34 This is 
reflected in Hashim bin Saud v Yahya & Anor,35where Harun J stated that the 
purpose of a detention under section 117 was subject to judicial control and that the 
power to detain rests finnly on the magistrate not the police. 36 Thus, the presumption 
of innocence under ordinary laws is well preserved under the CPC, which effectively 
regulates the conduct of the police in the course of their investigation. 
2.3 The Presumption of Innocence in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, the presumption of innocence is reflected under Article 5 (1) of 
the FederaL Constitution, which guarantees that: 
'No person shaLL be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in 
accordance with law'. 
However, in the instance one cannot expressly connote the words 'innocent' or 
'guilty' under the aforesaid Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. 37 Question then 
is, if the Federal Constitution guarantees that an accused person is innocent until 
proven guilty in a court of law, shouldn't such words be expressly provided? If 
otherwise, how did the phrase 'innocent until proven guilty' find its way in the 
Malaysian legal jurisprudence? 
32 Salleh bin Saad v PP [1983] 2 M.L.J. 164 
33 Article 5 (4) provides that 'where a person is arrested and not released he shall without unreasonable 
delay, and in any case within twenty-four hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey) be 
produced before a magistrate and shall not be further detained in custody without the magistrate's 
authority. 
34 Re The Detention ofR. Sivarasa and Ors [1996] 3.M.L.J. 611 
35 [1977] 1 M.L.J. 259 
36 !d. 262 
37 See UDHR 1984 and the Convention, which expressly provides therein. 
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In order to answer in the affinnative, an apt reading of Article 5(1) of the 
Federal Constitution is required and thus, would connote that constitutionally one 
cannot be executed, imprisoned or fined without proper course of justice taking place. 
Due process itself is not defined in the Federal Constitution, but it is universally 
accepted as what we tetm as a 'fair trial' 38and fair trial requires the thought that the 
prosecution is required to prove the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 
Further the Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan v PP9 which has been followed 
in Kekatong Sdn Bhd v Danaharta Urns Sdn Bluf0 states that reference to 'law' in 
such context as 'in accordance with the law' under the Federal Constitution , refer to a 
system of law, which incorporates fundamental rules of natural justice; a common law 
feature of England and Wales. Lord Diplock in examining the fundamental rules of 
natura] justice held to include the presumption of innocence. Thus, in criminal law, a 
person should not be punished for an offence unless it has been established to the 
satisfaction of an independent and unbiased tribunal that he committed it.4 1 
Further the Federal Court in Arulpragasan all Sandaraju42 applied the 
momentous decision of Woolmington v DPY3 and held that: 
'Thus it is wrong . . . to whittle down the cardinal principle of our 
criminal law on the presumption of innocence of the accused 
throughout the whole trial ... ' 
38 Tan, Yeo & Lee's, Constitutional law in Malaysia & Singapore (2"d ed) . Kevin YL Tan, Thio Li-ann, 
Butterworths Asia ( 1997) at p. 529 
39 [1981] I MLJ 64, at p 71 
40 [2003] 3 CLJ 378, following Che Ani !tam v Public Prosecutor [1984] I MLJ 113 
41 See: Ha w Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor & Associated Appeals [1981] 2 MLJ 49, where His Lordship 
made reference to Article 6(2) ECHR which provides that: 'Eve1y one charged with a criminal 
offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. ' 
42 [1997] 1 MLJ I at 24 
43 [ 1935] AC 462 
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In fact consensuses apply that the whole of the Malaysian criminal 
jurisprudence is based on the presumption ofinnocence. 44 This position is reflected in 
/(/zoon Chye Hin v Public Prosecuto/5 where Thompson CJ quotes Holroyd J that: 
'it is a maxim in English law that it is better that ten guilty men should 
escape than that one innocent man should suffer. ' 
Therefore in li ght of the above discussed, by virtue of our Article 5 of the 
Federal Constitution, which to a certain extend reflects the one recommended by the 
Reid Commission,46 and by virtue of the common law recognition of England and 
Wales and the application thereafter in our criminal cases, this right to be presumed 
innocent is streamlined in our criminal justice system and thus, becoming a time-
honoured principle of Jaw in our local legal jurisprudence.47 
This position is further enhanced by virtue of section 4(4) of the Human Rights 
Commission Act I999, which stipulates that 'regard shall be had to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights' , which would mean the observance of Article II of the 
UDHR I948. The incorporation of these rights into the Federal Constitution is, 
without a shadow of doubt a reflection of the importance placed by our forefathers in 
building a just and fair nation in oath ofthe UDHR I948 . 
44 Jerald Gomez, Advocate and Solicitor High Court of Malaya. Rights of Accused Person-Are 
Safeguards BeinW, Reduced? Paper presented at the 12111 Malaysian Law Conference held in Kuala 
Lumpur from lOu- 12'h December 2003, at p. 4 
45 [1961] 27 MLJ 105 at 108 
46 Rais Yatim, Freedom under Executive Power in Malaysia: A Study of Executive Supremacy (1995) 
Endowment Publications Kuala Lumpur. At p. 96-97 
14 
2.4 Presumption of Innocence in England and Wales 
In England and Wales, the widely accepted legal standard in criminal trial is 
that the prosecution bears the burden of proving every element of the offence charged 
beyond reasonable doubt and hence, under English criminal law a person is presumed 
to be innocent until otherwise proven guilty. The House of Lords laid down this 
general rule of the presumption of innocence, which has been described as "dear to 
the hearts of Englishmen"48 and declared to be "the undoubted law, axiomatic and 
elementary"49 in the landmark decision of Woolmington v DPP0in which Sir John 
Smith famously commented that 'never has the House of Lord done more noble a 
deed in the field of criminal law than on that day. ' 51 Viscount Sankey LC in his 
famous speech in the aforesaid case held that: 
"While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner, there is 
no... burden laid on the prisoner to prove his innocence and it is 
sufficient for him to raise a doubt as to his guilt.. Throughout the web 
of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, 
that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoners guilt ... and 
no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained "52 
47 Amer Hamzah bin Arshad, Rights of Accused Person: Are Safeguards Being Reduced? Infoline, 
Human Writes Issue 7 Jan/Feb 2004, at p. 2 
48 Williams, ProofofGuilt, 151 
(http://www.historycooperative.org/journalsll hr/23 .I /smith.html) 
49 Coffin v United States, 156 U.S. 432,453 [1895] 
50 [ 1935] AC 462 
51 Smith, "The presumption of innocence" [ 1987] 38 NILQ 223, at 224 
52 ld 481 
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This principle is now affirmed in the Human Rights Act 1998, which 
incorporates Article 6(2) Convention into English domestic law. 53 The European 
Court of Human Rights in Allenet de Ribermont v France54 held that the presumption 
of innocence in Article 6(2) is one of the elements necessary to ensure fair trial and 
stated the following: 
"The presumption of innocence .. . will be violated if a judicial decision 
concerning a person charged with a criminal offence reflects an 
opinion that he is guilty before he has been proved guilty according to 
law. It suffices, even in the absence of any formal finding that there is 
some reasoning suggesting that the court regard the accused as 
guilty ... Moreover, the Court reiterates that the Convention must be 
interpreted in such a way as to guarantee rights which are practical 
and effective as opposed to theoretical and illusory". 55 
2.5 Presumption of Innocence under Selected Jurisdiction 
In Canada, section 11 (d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
reads that "any person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal". In France, Article 9 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen, of constitutional value, reads that "every man is supposed innocent 
until having been declared guilty. " 
53 John Wadham & Helen Mountfield, Blackstone's Guide To The Human Rights Act 1998 (2"d ed 
2000) 
54 [1995] 20 EHRR 557. The Court of Human Rights held that this declaration of the applicant's guilt 
had ftrstly encouraged the public to regard him as guilty and, secondly, prejudiced the assessment of 
the facts by the judicial authority. 
55 !d. 33-35 
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The United States of America's Constitution has certain similarities with our 
Article 5 of the Federal Constitution. In which, although the presumption is not 
expressly reflected in the former Constitution, nevertheless, it .is widely held to stem 
from the Fifth Amendment, which reads that 'no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. '56 Therefore it is evident that the 
presumption of innocence operates in the most recognisable of legal systems and 
hence accorded due recognition. 
2.6 Conclusion 
It is reiterated that the presumption of innocence is reflected throughout the 
criminal process and its application is of universal in nature. Thus, failure to adhere to 
the presumption may lead to potential miscarriage of justice and as Packer contends, 
the presumption of innocence means that, until there has been an adjudication of guilt 
by an authority legally competent to make such an adjudication, the suspect is to be 
treated, for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the probable outcome of the 
case, as if his guilt is an open question. 57 
56 See Coffin v United States 156 U.S. 432,453 [1895] 
57 Herbert L. Packer, Loc. cit. 
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CHAPTER3 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND TERRORISM LAWS 
3.0 Introduction 
As aforementioned, the presumption of innocence is said to operate in two 
distinct contexts of the criminal process; firstly, in regards to the treatment of suspects 
or accused before and during trial and secondly, referring to the standard of proof in 
criminal cases. 58 For our present discussion, the application of this universal doctrine 
is confined to the first context, which is the pre-trial criminal stage. The pivotal 
discussion would be in light of preventive detention, and the ensuing denial of the 
right to counsel thereafter, which, obliterates this majestic right of innocence and 
proliferates manifest injustice in the criminal justice system, which has somewhat 
become undesirable and no longer seems to serve it's purpose of reducing crime and 
deliver justice. 59 
It would be demonstrated that those arrested under such anti-terrorism laws 
have been found guilty at the very outset, coupled with the over sensationalising of 
such arrest in the media with centre fold headlines like 'terror plot foiled' and 
'catastrophe averted', add to this perversion. Such statements impute guilt at the very 
outset and promote fear in the Community even before an unlikely trial. 60 
Governments in dealing with threats of terrorism fail to observe fundamental 
rights when enacting terrorism laws, and this is apparent especially when such laws 
provide ineffectual safeguards, which leave room for potential abuse of power by the 
Executive. Such propositions taken by the Govemment reflect that the law is not 
58 See Chapter 2: Presumption oflnnocence 
59 Professor Wu Min Atm, Human Rights and Law Enforcement. Keynote Address at Conference on 
Human Rights and the Administrative of Law Kuala Lumpm 9-10 Sept 2003. at p 1-2 
(http://www.cdu.eddu.au/law/staff/wu/wu2.htrn) 
60 Sarah Stephen, Muslim denied presumption of itmocence. Green left Weekly, November 16, 2005. 
This is evident especially under /SA 1960 which does not envisage a trial in a cout1 of law. 
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taken seriously.61 It is contended that such anti-terrorism measures remarkably change 
the very basic identity of the criminal justice system in that basic principles 
underlying detention and the right to counsel would be curtailed extensively. 
Adding to this state of predicament62 is the express insecurity in relation to the 
diverse definition of terrorism that has ascended along the century. The reason for 
such diversity in the absence of any one single accepted definition of terrorism as Dr. 
Abdul Haseeb describes is due to its polymorphous term; its meaning changes with 
the change of situations in which terrorist acts are committed, one man's terrorist is 
another man's freedom fighter. 63 
In fact it should be pointed out that even the Islamic criminal law does not 
provide any definition of terrorism as neither the Quran, nor the Hadith literature 
specifically indicates the crime ofterrorism.64 However, to some length a definition of 
terrorism can be made out in the Islamic jurisprudence as the use of violence by 
Muslims or non-Muslims organisations for political purpose against any legal and 
legitimate state. Thus, the key factor therefore is violence. 65 
This proposition that it may be impossible to have one single definition of 
ten·orism is supported by both reigning and incumbent Premier's of Malaysia. 
Ironically, both Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Tun Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad seem to define terrorism in a very broad manner. Our reigning Premier 
61 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977), at 205 
62 Further, it is regretted that the liberty of an accused person is left at the hands of the Executive rather 
than the Judiciary especially when the nature of the alleged offence is one which is regarded to be so 
serious that judicial intervention is highly necessary. 
63 The learned author describes that although terrorist acts are as old as man, nevertheless the word 
' terrorism ' is of recent and it is concurred to be an all encompassing word. In which until recent a 
whole new dimension has been added to its definition as being a threat to international peace and 
security pursuant to the United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373. Dr. Abdul Haseeb 
Ansari. Terrorism, National Integrity and Human Rights : A Critical Appraisal , (2002) 3 MLJ at pp 
ccv-ccvi. 
64 Dr. Mohanm1ad Shabbir, Outlines of Criminal Law and Justice in Islam, International Law Book 
Services, at p. 208 
65 Ibid, this may range to the use of chemicals/explosives, kidnapping to destruction of property 
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reasons that terrorism includes among others, groups intending to overthrow 
governments through extra constitutional means or introduce a new system of 
governance through militant attacks. 66 Whereas our incumbent Premier even 
suggested that armed or other forms of attacks against civilians should be considered 
as teiTorism. 67 
With due respect, it is humbly submitted that both the aforesaid definitions are 
at extreme ends. Such broad definitions could lead to manifest miscarriage of justice 
and although it was cited by the incumbent Premier that the United Nations would 
seem to be the only appropriate body competent enough to call for a unified definition 
of terrorism,68 nevertheless in light of the stigma attached, in which terrorism is 
regarded as the greatest enemy of humankind today,69 such perilous attempts may 
lead to potential erosion of the presumption of innocence. 
3.1 Terrorism Defined 
Although nations have united in one voice to fight terrorism, which is 
regarded as a global threat, what has left divided is the need for a single and 
comprehensive definition of terrorism. In most cases it is opined that the reason for 
such vague and undesirable culminations of definitions is a result of rather a knee jerk 
reaction than a thoughtful and detailed analysis required ofthe aforesaid. 
Both the Malaysian and British parliament had passed various terrorism laws 
that define terrorism in a very broad marmer leaving potential abuse of power by the 
executive which in tum may disregard fundamental principles of law especially m 
regards to presumption of innocence. 
66 Have A Common Understanding of Threats of Terrorism, Asean Told, Kuala Lumpur, May 20 
(Bernama) 
67 Dr. Mahathir Calls for Global Definition, Action Against Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, April I 
(Bernama) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia 
68 !bid 
69 Ibid 
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3.1.1 Definition of Terrorism in Malaysia 
Although there are profusion of laws that exist in Malaysia in relation to 
terrorism related offences, the insertion of the new Chapter VIA "Offences relating to 
Terrorism" to the Penal Code (Amendment) Act 200J (Act A1 21 0) is an attempt by the 
Government on a global mission to fight terrorism without realising that Malaysia can 
cope and fight terrorism with existing laws especially under the !SA 1960.70 
The following amendments were made to the Penal Code defining 'terrorist' 
to mean any person who commits, or attempts to commit any terrorist act; or 
participates in or facilitates the commission of any terrorist act. 71 Pursuant to section 
1 JOB 'tetTorist act' seem to embrace all types of situation which may not even be 
regarded to fall under such act. Section 1 JOB provides: 
(2) For the purpose of this Chapter, 'terrorist act' means an act or threat of action 
within or beyond Malaysia that: 
(a) involves serious bodily injury to a person; 
(b) involves serious damage to property; 
(c) endangers a person's life; 
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or the safety of the public or a section of the 
public; 
(e) involves the use of firearms, explosive or other lethal devices; 
(f) involves releasing into the environment or any part of the environment or 
distributing or exposing the public or any part of the public to-
(i) any dangerous, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance; 
(ii) any toxic chemical; or 
(iii) any microbial or other biological agent or toxin 
7
° For further reading see Chapter 4: Terrorism Laws in Malaysia 
71 Section 130B (1) (a) & (b) 
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(g) is designed or intended to disrupt or seriously interfere with, any computer 
system or the provision of any services directly related to communications 
infrastructure, banking or financial services, utilities, transportation or other 
essential infrastructure; 
(h) is designed or intended to disrupt, or seriously interfere with, the provision of 
essential emergency services as police, civil defence or medical services; 
(i) involves prejudice to national security o public safety; or 
U) involves any combination of any of the acts specified in paragraphs (a) to (i), 
where the act of threat is intended or may reasonably be regarded as being 
intended to-
(aa) intimidate the public or a section of the public; or 
(bb) influence or compel the Government of Malaysia or the Government of any 
State in Malaysia, any other Government, or any international organisation to do 
or refrain from doing any act, and includes any act or omission constituting an 
offence under the Aviation Offences Act 1984 (Act 307) 
3.1.2 Definition of Terrorism in England and Wales 
In England and Wales, the ATCSA 2001 which is regarded as a product of post 
September 11, 2001 attacks in New York defines 'terrorist' as a person who is or has 
been concerned in acts of 'international terrorism' or belongs or has links to an 
international terrorist group72and 'terrorism' has the meaning set out in section I of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 in the following: 
(1) In this Act 'terrorism' means the use or threat of action where-
(a) the action falls within subsection (2) 
72 Part 4 of the A TCSA 200 I 
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(b) the use of threat is designed to influence the government or intimidate the 
public or a section of the public, and 
(2) Action falls within the subsection ifit-
(a) involves serious violence against a person 
(b) involves serious damage to property 
(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the 
action 
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public, or 
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic 
system 
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of 
fireatms or explosive is terrorism whether or not subsection (1) (b) is satisfied 
( 4) In this section-
( a) 'action' includes outside the United Kingdom 
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to 
property, wherever suited 
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country 
other than the United Kingdom, and 
(d) 'the government' means the government of the united Kingdom, of a part 
of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom 
(5) in this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a 
reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organization 
The PTA 2005 defines 'terrorism' as the use or threat of action designed to 
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public with the 
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purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. In regards to terrorism 
related activity, these include the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of 
tetTorism, facilitating or encouraging such acts. It is immaterial whether the acts of 
tetTorism in question are specified acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism generally. 
It is clear that each of the relevant provisions under the Terrorism Act 2000, 
ATCSA 2001 and the PTA 2005 attempt to define terrorism and terrorism acts in a 
very broad manner without any consistency of resemblance to each other and seem to 
disparage the very requisite elements of crime in which both the act and requisite 
intent must be present in order for there to be a crime. This is evident especially in 
regards to the apathetic usage of words like where the act or threat is intended or may 
reasonably be regarded as being intended to, is ambiguous and vague. 73 It would be 
hardly impossible to establish intention without the admission of evidential issues in 
the aforesaid context especially when such offences are instantaneously regarded as 
matters ofnational security and hence, explicitly tying the hands ofthejudiciary. 
3.2 Conclusion 
It is worrying that detention without trial under anti-terrorism laws has gained 
tremendous support in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre 
and Pentagon and the culminating terror attacks in Madrid, London and in Bali. This 
suggest that the world has joined forces to counter future terrorist attacks by 
implementing various terrorism laws which clearly infringe basic rights accorded to 
an accused person, especially the right to be presumed innocence. In fact the 
solidarity and justification for such laws expressed by world leaders has given our 
very own !SA 1960 a new lease of life for its existence and continued justification. For 
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whatever validation it may attach, one thing is certain, that such laws are as much 
greater danger to ordinary citizens than to terrorist. 74 
It would also seem appropriate to mention that although it was never a forum 
for such discussion in this paper, that inevitably, terrorism laws have triggered social 
unrest among certain religious quarters that seem to be the obvious targets under such 
laws. As the case may be, although not many have been charged with a crime linked 
to acts of terrorism but it is certain that many had been stripped of their fundamental 
rights in the process. 
The potential miscaiTiage of justice that may occur from such laws are when 
an accused is held in detention without charge, without access to an advocate, and in 
solitary confinement without any contact with family members or may even face 
deportation, without any hearing or given a chance to contest in a court of law. The 
unfortunate predicament is that enforcement authorities have justified torture of 
ten·orist suspects in light of the severity of the offence if committed. The failure to 
adhere to fundamental and procedural rights not only injure those who are wrongfully 
accused but ultimately ourselves.75 
73 Edmund Bon, Terrorizing the Terrorists, Paper presented at the Public Forum on ' Anti-Terrorism 
Laws and National Security' on 8 December 2003 jointly organized by the Bar Council, SUARAM 
& HAKAM. The Malaysian Bar. (www.malaysianbar.org.com) 
74 James R. Elwood & Janet B. Woostein, Dictatorship at Your Doorstep. Why "Anti-Tenorism" Laws 
Threaten You. (May 2002) 
(http://www. is il.org/resources/lit/ dictatorship-at-doorstep. htm I #author) 
75 US v Salerno 481 US 739 [ 1987], per Justice Marshall 
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CHAPTER4 
ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS IN MALAYSIA 
4.0 Introduction 
'So, your inquiry here is not to determine whether each accused is guilty or innocent, 
because innocence is not something an accused person is required to prove'. 76 
In Malaysia unlike in England and Wales, 77 pursuant to Article 4 of the 
Federal Constitution, the Constitution is regarded as the supreme law of the land and 
being a written constitution it personifies, amongst others, the important rules about 
the framework of government and pronouncements about the rights and duties of 
citizens and non-citizens alike. 78 
This fortified concept of the supremacy of the Federal Constitution is echoed 
111 the judgment of Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as he then was) in Loh Kooi Choon v 
Government of Malaysia/9 where his lordship held, that among others, the 
fundamental concept of the rule of law is an entrenched concept within the Federal 
Constitution and which is reflected in Articles 5-13 of Part II of the Federal 
Constitution. The ultimate aim of the rule of law is to secure and guard individual 
rights against any exercise of arbitrary powers by the State. 80 
76 Ian Barker QC to the jury at the commencement of the trial in 1982. Extract taken from: Innocence 
Regained the Fight to Free. Lindy Chamberlain, Norman H. Young. The Federation Press 1989 
77 In England and Wales the Constitution is unwritten, however it has inter alia, certain set of laws, 
customs and conventions that is adhered to. 
78 Amer Harnzah bin Arshad, Rights of Accused Persons: Are Safeguards Being Reduced? Infoline 
Human Writes. Issue 7 Jan/Feb 2004. 
79 [1977] 2 MLJ 188 
80 His lordship held, apart from recognising the concept of the rule of law that embodies the Federal 
Constitution, the other two concepts include, the distribution of sovereign power between the States 
and the Federation, and the concept of separation of powers among the Executive, Legislative and 
Judicial branches of government, compendiously expressed in modern terms that we are a 
government of laws, not of men. 
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This notion ofthe rule of law is further enhanced with the principle of natural justice81 
to which both these principles fonn the nucleus of an ideal criminal justice system. 82 
However, the paramount consideration of any criminal justice system apart from 
observing Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution is the conformity to the right to a 
fair trial, which represents a manifestation of a bundle of basic and fundamental rights 
accorded to the accused person. These fundamental rights are preserved under the 
Federal Constitution expressly providing for certain available rights to the accused 
person at both pre-trial83 and trial stages, which includes the point in discussion, the 
right to be presumed innocent in pre-trial stage. 
Though it may seem at first hand that the accused person is weJJ protected 
under the Federal Constitution, nevertheless, upon detail examination of what is 
regarded as the annour of aJJ safeguards accorded to an accused person only seem the 
opposite when in direct conflict with the provisions of anti-terrorism laws, which is 
inadvetiently attributed to the surrotmding circumstances leading to the birth of the 
Federal Constitution itself. 
81 The court in Kanda v Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] MLJ 169 held that the 
principle of natural justice embodies two essential rights which is the right to be heard and the rule 
against biasness and these rights are entrenched in Articles 5(/) and 8(/) of the Federal Constitution. 
82 Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1981] I MLJ 64 
83 The right of accused persons to be informed of the grounds of arrest under Article 5 (3) of the Federal 
Constitution , and the right to production before a Magistrate under Article 5(4) of the Federal 
Constitution. 
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4.1 Anti-Terrorism Laws 
The state of affairs clouding over Malaya during the preceding and post 
independence has to some extent influenced the shape of the constitutional character 
of the Federal Constitution84with the insertion of Article I 49. The significance of 
Article I 49 of the Federal Constitution is that it allows the Government to enact 
legislations which may potentially affect customary constitutional rights that are 
reflected within the Constitutional text itself. 85 
One such law that was enacted by the Government was the !SA I 960 in which 
fom1er Chief Justice of Malaysia Tun Mohamed Dzaiddin Abdullah describes as a 
special piece of legislation that has its provenance in Article I49 of the Federal 
Constitution I 957.86 Thus, the !SA I 960 as iterated by former Prime Minister Dr. 
Mahathir is the central arsenal of the Executive to curb terrorism in Malaysia. 87 
Apart from the !SA I 960 and Article I 49,88 the following laws below would 
demonstrate the extent in which these laws curtail fundamental liberties enshrined in 
the Federal Constitution: 
1. ArticLe I 50 FC: Proclamation of Emergenci9 
2. Chapter VI 'Offences Against the State' ofthe Penal Code (Act 593)90 
3. Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2003 (Act Al210)91 
84 A cloud of political uncertainty and struggle hovered over Malaya during the insurgency of the 
Communist from 1948 to 1960 to which the British issued an emergency proclamation in 1948. This 
continued through independence and ended only in 1960. Extract taken from: Ramdas Tikamdas, 
ationa l Security and Constitutional Rights-The Internal Security Act 1960. 
(www.malaysianbar.org.my) 
85 ib id 
86 Mohamed Dzaiddin Abdullah, National Security Considerations under the Internal Security Act 
1960-Recent Developments, First presented at a conference on "Constitutionalism, Human Rights 
and Good Governance" at Kua la Lumpur on 30 Sept to 1 Oct 2003, at p 1 
87 Malaysia's Internal Security Act and Suppression of Political Dissent, A Human Rights Watch 
Backgrounder, Human Rights Watch (http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/malaysia-bck-0513 .htrn) 
88 Provides for legislation against subversion, action prejudicial to public order 
89 The following laws are yet to be revoked: 
i) Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 1969 
ii) Essential (Security Cases) Regulations 1975 (ESCAR) 
iii) Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 
9
° Chapter VI in general provides a list of offences committed against the Yang di Pertuan Agong or 
the Ruler or Yang di Pertua Negeri. One notable section is Section 121which provides; Waging or 
attempting to wage war, or abetting the waging of war. 
9 1 The Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2003 (Act A 1210) was passed in 2003 , in which, it received Royal 
Assent on 17 December 2003 and thereafter published in the Gazette on 25 December the same year. 
Aliran, Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code: Aliran's representation to the Parliamentary 
Select Committee. Aliran Monthly Vol. 24 (2004): Issue 10. 
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4. Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulation 1975 (P.U.(A) 362) 
The aforesaid bundles of laws apart from the !SA 1960 are well equipped to deal with 
terrorism related offences. In the Grik incident, the prosecution successfully relied on 
section 121 of the Penal Code in the prosecution of Al-Ma'unah group to which the 
trial judge concurred that the offence amounted to an act of terrorism. 92Consequent ly 
such laws have made tremendous inroads to our fundamental liberties especially in 
regards to the presumption of innocence. 
4.2 The Presumption of Innocence under the ISA 1960 
The !SA 1960 was enacted to serve and wipe out the insurgency of the 
communist gue1Tilla threat and although it no longer serves its true purpose93 it 
remains a pem1anent and forceful feature in our democratic society and hence, it has 
been used over the years for various reasons culminating from ethnic riots in 1969, 
political and religious activiti es throughout the early 1960's to late 1990's, identity 
paper forgery, smuggling of illegal migrant workers, to suppress peaceful political, 
academic and social activities, legitimate constructive criticism by NGOs and other 
social pressure groups94 and now as a global issue to eliminate terrorism .95 
Wl1at makes the !SA 1960 so potently dangerous in its application is that it 
g1ves the Executive absolute power to deprive a person of his or her liberty 
(http://www.a liran.com/oldsite/monthly/2004bll Oh.htm 1) 
92 Edmond Bon, Ten·orizing the Terrorist, Paper presented at the Public Forum on ' Anti Terrorism 
Laws and ationa l Security' on gth December 2003 . Jointly organized by the Bar Council , SUARAM 
& HAKAM (http://www.malaysianbar.org.my) 
93 The credibility of the /SA /960 was lost when the Communist Party of Malaya signed a formal peace 
treaty in Thailand in 1989. 
94 For comprehensive reading, see: Amnesty International Report Malaysia, Human Rights 
Undermined: Restrictive Laws in a Parliamentary Democracy. 1 Sept 1999. At pp. 6- 12. 
(file: //A:\Abolish ISA Movement.htm) 
95 The use of !SA /960 was justified as the governme~t recognized potential tlu·eat emanating from 
Islamist extremist namely the KMM, Jemaah Islanuyaah and the Madrassah Lugmanul Hakiem 
founded by Abu Bakar Bashir operating in Ma laysia. Human Rights Watch Publication 
29 
indefinitely without trial solely for preventive reasons which goes against the very 
fundamental principles of law including the presumption of innocence. 96 The !SA 
I 960 had completely removed any recourse for judicial review, which were the only 
safeguards designed to protect abuse from any exercise of power by the Executive. In 
1989 a series of amendments were intensified signalling a 'hands of intent by the 
Executive to the Judiciary with the insertion of section 8B of the !SA I960 which 
provides an ouster clause that reads: (1) There shall be no judicial review in any court 
of law, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done 
or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of 
their discretionary power in accordance with this Act, save in regard to any question 
on compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or 
d . . 97 eCIS IOn. 
The ensumg discussion is therefore confined relatively to only detention 
orders under section 8 and 60 day intetTogation period under section 7 3 (I) of the !SA 
I 960 and the denial of the right to counsel therein, whjch clearly violates the accused 
right of im1ocence. It therefore warrants the author to reside in full the aforesaid 
draconian provisions under the said Act below to highlight the potential abuse of 
h . . 98 powers by the relevant aut ont1es. 
4.2.1 Section 73 of the ISA 1960 
Section 73 deals with Police Power of Arrest and Detention which provides: 
(1) that any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending enquiries 
any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe 
96 Other rights include the right to liberty of the person, freedom from arbitrary arrest, the right to be 
informed of the reasons for arrest and the right to a fair and open trial. 
97 Further the !SA /960 fails to provide any specific determination as to what activities may or may not 
amount to tlu-eat to security or the maintenance of essentia l services and as such, determination is 
within the sole subjective discretion of the Minister concern which may lead to potential abuse of 
powers therein. 
98 By both the Executive and the enforcement agency i.e. the police authority 
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(a) that there are grounds which would justify his detention under section 8; and 
(b) that he has acted or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of 
Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or the 
economic life thereof. 
(2) Any officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending enquiries any person, 
who upon being questioned by the officer fails to satisfy the officer as to his identity 
or as to the purposes for which he is in the place where he is found, and who the 
officer suspects has acted or is about to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of 
Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to 
the economic life thereof. 
(3) Any person arrested under this section may be detained for a period not exceeding 
sixty days without any order of detention having been made in respect of him under 
section 8: 
Provided that-
(a) he sha11 not be detained for more than twenty four hours except with the authority 
of a police officer of or above the rank of Inspector; 
(b) he shall not be detained for more than forty eight hours except with the authority 
of a police officer of or above the rank of Assistant Superintendent; and 
(c) he sha11 not be detained for more than thirty days unless a police officer of or 
above the rank of Deputy Superintendent has reported the circumstances of the 
arrest and detention to the Inspector General or to a police officer designated by 
the Inspector General in that behalf, who shall forthwith report the same to the 
Minister 
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4.2.2 Section 8 of the ISA 1960 
Section 8 deals with Ministerial Order of Detention which provides: 
(1) if the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary with a view 
to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or 
any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services99 therein or the economic 
life thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter referred to as "a detention order") 
directing that the person be detained for any period not exceeding two years. 
(7) The Minister may direct that the duration of any detention order or restriction 
order be extended for such further period, not exceeding two years, as he may specify, 
and thereafter for such further periods, not exceeding two years at a time, as he may 
specify, either-
(a) on the same grounds as those on which the order was originally made; 
(b) on grounds different from those on which the order was originally made; or 
(c) partly on the same grounds and partly on different grounds : 
Provided that if the detention order is extended on different grounds or partly on 
different grounds the person to whom it relates shall have the same rights under 
section 11 as if the order extended as aforesaid was a fresh order, and section 12 sha11 
apply accordingly. 
99 Subsection 2 defines essential services to mean any services, business, trade, undertaking, 
manufacture or occupation included in the Third Schedule. 
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4.3 The Application of the Presumption under Sections 8 and 73 of the ISA 1960 
The !SA 1960 empowers the government to detain any person without any 
recourse for judicial review 100 for a period not exceeding two years and to which it 
may be renewed indefinitely and the police without any warrant of arrest in the course 
of their investigation for a period of up to 60 days. This therefore is a clear violation 
of fundamental rights effecting the presumption of innocence enshrined in the Federal 
Constitution pursuant to Article 5. 
Although the reviewability of police detention under section 73 was made 
possible in the Federal Court's landmark decision in Mohamad Ezam bin. Mohd 
Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals 101 the same however cannot be said of 
the Ministerial Order of Detention under section 8. 102 But before embarking on the 
latter, it warrants foremost to discuss the relevant cases leading to the monumental 
decision by the Federal Court in Moltamad Ezam in relation to police detention under 
section 73. 
Prior to the landmark decision in Mohamad Ezam, there were many 
controversial cases under section 73 in which the courts favoured a subjective test for 
judicial review which placed the burden on the detainee to show that the power 
exercised was mala fide or made for collateral or ulterior purpose. 
In the case of Theresa Lim Chin. Chin. & Ors v Inspector General of 
Police, 103 the Appellants were arrested under section 7 3 and appealed to the Supreme 
Court104 on grounds amongst other, that the police powers under section 73 is 
100 Section 8 of the !SA 1960 
101 [2002] 4 MLJ 449 
102 See below the case of Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin bin Nasir [2003] 1 CLJ 345, 348 
103 [ 1988] I MLJ 293. One of the earlier Federal Court cases that applied the subjective test was the 
case of Re Inspector-General of Police v Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun [ 1988] I MLJ 182, 
which was later restated and expanded in the case of Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector 
General of Police [ 1988] 1 MLJ 293 
104 The High Court rejected their application for habeas corpus for their release on the ground that the 
arrest was illegal. 
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judicially reviewable and therefore the correct test is one which is objective. The 
Supreme Court once again by dismissing the appeal rejected this argument and 
espoused a broad approach in the interpretation of the scheme of legislation both 
under the Federal Constitution and the !SA 1960. 
The Supreme Court held that the police power to arrest and detain pending 
enquiry pursuant to section 73 is not to be regarded as an independent scheme of 
detention under the !SA 1960 but rather the initial stage in the scheme leading to the 
preventive detention under section 8. This, coupled with the argument that Article 151 
(3) of the Federal Constitution, provides that the authoriti 05 need not disclose facts 
where disclosure would in its opinion, be against the national interest pursuant to 
section 16 of the !SA 1960.1 06Therefore since sections 7 3 and section 8 were held to 
be one scheme of preventive detention, the right of non-disclosure under the aforesaid 
Article 151 was conferred on both the Minister as well as the police. 
This decision clearly reflects the potency of the !SA 1960 which hinders the 
court from assessing the fairness of detention pending inquiry pursuant to section 73 
and section 8 order as any evidence obtained in the course of investigation is not 
subject for disclosure when national security reasons are invoked. This is made 
pursuant to Article 151 (3) and section 16 which allows the police and the Executive 
to withhold any information on grounds of national interest and the court is only 
limited to infom1ation that is presented voluntarily before it and nothing more. 107 The 
significance of this decision is that it ties the hands of the judiciary but most 
105 
"Authority" here would include all those with powers dealing with preventive detention 
106 The Supreme Comt supported the proposition that evidence and information relating to arrest and 
detentions, either at the initial stage or in pursuant to the Ministerial order is excluded from public 
disclosme pursuant to section 16 of the !SA 1960 and under Article 151 (3) of the Federal 
Constitution 
107 Ibid 
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importantly, it takes away the presumption of innocence, a fundamental safeguard 
accorded to an accused person. 
However the paradigm in relation to powers under section 73 shifted in the 
case of Mollamad Ezam. 108 Here, the Federal Court in hearing an appeal for an 
app lication against the earlier decision of the High Court in refusing to grant the writ 
of habeas corpus for the applicants release 109 considered several grounds of appeal put 
forth by counsels contesting the legality of the said arrest and detention. 
The thrust of the appellants' contention was that the exercise of the powers of 
detention by the respondent under section 73 was mala fide and improper because 
from the evidence and circumstances of the case, their arrest and detention were not 
for the dominant purpose of the aforesaid section, that is, to enable the police to 
conduct further investigation regarding the appellants' acts and conduct which were 
prejudicial to the security of Malaysia, but merely for intelligence gathering which 
was unconnected with national security. 
The Federal Court allowed the appeal on the basis, inter alia, that the detention 
was mala fide as it was made with an ulterior or collateral purpose unconnected with 
national security issue. 110 The Federal Court therefore considered the reviewability of 
police powers under section 73 especially in regards to the subjective test laid down in 
the earlier cases highlighted above. 111 The Federal Court clearly disagreed with its 
predecessor's 112 and held that both sections 73 and 8 are independent of each other as 
108 The appellants were all anested and detained on 10 and 11 Apr 01 under section 73 of the !SA. The 
reason for the detention as stated in the respondent's affidavit was that the appellants were planning a 
street demonstration in Kuala Lumpur on 14 April2001 involving some 50,000 people. 
109 The learned High Court judge held in dismissing their application that the appellants had been 
arrested and detained in the exercise of a valid power and that the appeliants had failed to show that 
the respondent had acted mala fide in their arrest and detention. 
110 The Appellants were not intenogated on their alleged militant action but instead were questioned on 
their political activates. 
111 See the case of Re Inspector-General of Police v Tan Sri Raja Khalid bin Raja Harun [ 1988] 1 MLJ 
182 and Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v Inspector General of Police [ 1988] 1 MLJ 293 
112 ibid 
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the Minister can in fact detain a person pursuant to section 8 of the !SA 1960 without 
even considering or relying on police investigation. 
The Federal Court further observed that Article 151 (3) of the Federal 
Constitution should not be a restraining factor in determining the Court's power of 
judicial review on detention under section 73(1) on the following ground that firstly, 
the aforesaid Article relates to non-disclosure of facts upon which the detention order 
is based and not the grounds for detention and secondly, the aforesaid Article 151 (3) 
only bars information concerning matters of national security from being disclosed to 
the detainee and not to the court as such. 
The preferred test as concurred by the Federal Court reflects an objective test 
in which police powers of detention in the course of investigation under section 73 are 
reviewable by the Courts. The burden is therefore, placed on the police officer to 
satisfy to the Court that he had reason to believe pursuant to subsection (a) and (b) of 
the said section 73 . Therefore, the Court correctly held that the burden of satisfying 
the Court by way of material evidence, that the detainee had acted or were about to 
act or were likely to act in a manner prejudicial to security of the State rest on the 
detaining authority, in which in this case it had failed to discharge so. Although the 
case of Mohamad Ezam reflects a paradigm shift in relation to the reviewability of 
police detention under section 73, nevertheless the law in relation to judicial review of 
detention order made by the Minister pursuant to section 8 still remains highly 
controversial. 
This was addressed in Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin bin Nasir, 113 
in which, the central issue on appeal was whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear 
113 [2003] 1 CLJ 345, 348 
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complaint against detention order issued by the Minister under section 8114 and 
whether the legality or otherwise of section 8 depends on the detention under section 
73.115 
The Federal Court on the first issue clearly held that there is no scope for 
judicial review of detention orders issued under section 8 citing that the ouster clause 
in section 8B which is regarded as a constitutional provision calculatedly removes any 
scope for review and in regards to the second issue, it held that the legality of section 
8 detention does not depend on the legality of section 73 detention as the relevancy of 
the allegations made by the police on which the detention order was based was a 
matter for the Minister to determine and for him alone. This therefore means that the 
Court's hands are tied as to any possib le examination of the Minister's conclusion 
thereby upholding a subjective test to that effect. 
This case therefore clearly illustrates that unlike the decision in Mollamad 
Ezam where judicial review is possible in light of police detention under section 73, 
the same cannot be said of detention order under section 8 issued by the Minister. 
This therefore clearly curtails the right to be presumed innocent as there is no scope 
for review for an accused person under detention orders made pursuant to section 8 
and worst still is that the accused person is not even tried in a court of law for the 
alleged offence concluded by the Minister whose conclusion is not examinable. 
114 The facts of the case was conclusive as the Respondent was granted by the High Court the writ of 
habeas corpus for his release despite an issuance of an order for detention under section 8. Therefore 
it was argued that since custody of the Respondents were already handed over to the Minister and in 
view of the ouster clause under the aforesaid section, the court had no powers of review. 
115 The Appellants argued that the detention under section 73 was illegal as the police rather than 
applying their minds on whether the detention ought to be extended or otherwise as permitted under 
section 73(3) in fact extended the detention mechanically vide the inherent powers within the 
scheme. As such the illegality of detention under the aforesaid section had tainted the legality of any 
ensuing detention order under section 8. 
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4.3.1 Safeguards a Reflection of the Presumption of Innocence 
Although detention orders made by the Minister pursuant to section 8 are not subject 
to judicial review and therefore curtails the presumption of innocence, nevertheless to 
some extent this presumption, which operates as a safeguard, is reflected within the 
scheme of the !SA I960. 
4.3.1.1 The Advisory Board : Section 11 of the ISA 1960 
Upon completion of the 60 day investigation period by the police, the Minister may 
then, upon, in reliance or otherwise of the material evidence gathered by the police, 
proceed to make a detention order pursuant to section 8, to which the detainee is 
entitled of a copy of the order. 116Therefore, in the absence of an opportunity for a 
detainee to be heard in an open court, the Advisory Board is thus placed pursuant to 
section II of the !SA I960 in line with Article 151 of the Federal Constitution, which 
then allows a detainee to state his case. It seems therefore that the presumption of 
innocence is well reflected within the scheme of section II as the advisory board 
provides an opportunity for a detainee to make representations as to his innocence to 
the Board. 
However, although the Advisory Board may seem to be an effective safeguard against 
any potential abuse of powers made by the police and the Executive in the ensuing 
detention order, nevertheless the Board has its weaknesses and as such, may not 
reflect the proposition that it represents a reflection of the operation of the 
presumption of innocence. 
116 The order would enclose a statement of the grounds on which the order was made and the 
allegations of fact on which the order was based. Amnesty International Report Malaysia, Human 
Rights Undermined: Restrictive Laws in a Parliamentary Democracy, 1 September 1999. Amnesty 
International Report on ISA (SUARAM) (file: //A:\Abolish ISA Movement.htm) 
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This is apparent, as although the Advisory Board is a necessary instrument 
under Article 151 of the Federal Constitution, which requires that in any law 
sanctioning preventive detention, as in the !SA 1960, should contain provisions which 
allow the detainee to make representation to an Advisory Board, however, stipulates 
that the composition of the Board should be made up of three members appointed by 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, whom is advised by the Cabinet, and including a judge or 
retired judge. 11 7 Therefore although the Advisory Board is regarded as a substitute for 
an ordinary court, however, the composition of the Advisory Board does not reflect or 
even come close to a full bench of judges as in the ordinary court and therefore, the 
Board may be biased in its function as a body of review, despite the Board having in 
its arm only one judge or even a retired judge. This is because the majority of the 
Advisory Board is made up of members appointed, although by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong, nonetheless, is made upon the advice of the Cabinet, whom may have an 
interest and therefore indirectly may influence the outcome of any decision taken by 
the Advisory Board in the absence of equal judicial representation. 
Further section 12(1) ofthe !SA 1960, as amended, no longer requires that the 
Board make a recommendation within three months of a detainee's representation, as 
it now, under the said amended provision allow undefined periods. It is iterated that 
justice should be dispensed without any delay, as is may cause hardship and anxiety 
on the detainee who had made the representation, but most importantly, it may result 
in miscarriage of justice. Even upon having made the recommendation, in which, the 
Board is required to review the case every six months, the Amnesty International 
Report on ISA, states that this practice does not often occur. 11 8 
117 Ibid, this is reflected in section II of the /SA 1960 
118 Ibid 
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The Advisory Board is regarded as a toothless body of review and unlike the 
courts; do not have any jurisdiction to order the release of the detainee. What the 
Advisory Board can do within its inherent powers is only to make recommendation 
for the release of detainee or continued detention to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, 
whom has absolute discretion and unquestionable even by the court. Further, in 
review of the detention order, the Advisory Board, includes in its assessment; 
evidence obtained in the course of police investigation and the recommendations of 
the police. In most cases, such evidence is obtained in the course of prolonged and 
aggressive interrogation, which, may amount to torture and ill treatment by the police. 
Amnesty International again observes that, techniques of interrogation by Special 
Branch police, including persuasion, deception, and coercion involving intense mental 
and physical pressure amounting to torture, have become entrenched methods of 
interrogation under the !SA 1960. 11 9This was apparent in the Anwar Ibrahjm trial, 
where evidence adduced by forens ic experts suggest that there were many injuries 
inflicted at Anwar Ibrahim at potentially lethal places, which amounted to a blunt 
d . h" d . 120 trauma unng . IS etentwn. 
This is a clear violation of international norms prohibiting such practices on 
grounds that it infringes human rights standards, 121 especially under Article 5 of the 
UDHR which provides that, 'no one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or ptmishment'. 
119 Ibid 
120 Ibid 
121 Article 3 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subject to Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment states: 'No State may permit or 
tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Exceptional 
circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment'. 
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Such evidence obtained therefore, is inadmissible and should never be 
admitted in the assessment process, but then again, the Advisory Body, being a 
creature of the Executive, may ignore fundamental rules of evidence. 
4.4 Right to Counsel under the ISA 1960 
The right to counsel is regarded as one of the most fundamental rights 
accorded to an accused person, 122 and as such, this right finds it place in the heart of 
the Federal Constitution. 123 Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution, which provides, 
in the following reproduced: 
'Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may be of 
the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be 
defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. ' 
Although without doubt the right to counsel is accorded a constitutional 
distinctiveness by virtue of the said Article 5 (3), however, due to its insularity of 
construction, the gloss of elitism accorded had been whittled down over the years as a 
result of courts indecisive rulings. This is evident where it has always been a constant 
debate between the legal counsel and the police as to when the aforesaid right truly 
begins? It is opined that the right to counsel should begin from the very moment the 
122 The Constitution of the United States provides that every accused person has the right to counsel 
upon arrest and unless he chooses to waive the said right it is absolute. See Miranda v Arizona 384 
us 436 [1966] ussc 
123 Article 5(3) is a reinstatement of a right to counsel which existed even before the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia in the form of s 255 of the CPC (F.M.S. Cap. 6) where it provides that 
subject to ... any express provision of law to the contrary, every person accused before any Criminal 
Cowt may of right be defended by an advocate. (Act 593 Rev. 1999) and s 250 of the CPC (S.S. cap. 
21) now repealed by Act A908 to which these provisions had granted to every person accused the 
right to be defended by an advocate. This is in conformity with the decision of the High Court judge 
Hashim Yeop A. Sarti 1 in Ooi Ah Phua v Officer in Charge of Criminal Investigation, Kedah/Perlis 
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accused person is arrested and as such any form of delay should not be compromised 
as it would be unconstitutional to do so. Any delay in the right to counsel is an 
encroachment of the presumption of innocence accorded to an accused person, more 
so, in light of the ineffective judicial safeguards apparent under the !SA 1960. 124 
This predicament arises as a result of the phrasing of Article 5 (3) of the 
Federal Constitution, in that, although it provides for a right to counsel, however it 
does not expressly or impliedly state when such right can be exercised. This therefore 
in practise makes the aforesaid right rather ineffective as a suspect can be picked up 
by the police without having any idea of what the charge is and because counsel has 
no access, the suspect cannot be advised of his legal right. 
In conforming this, Federal CID Director Commissioner Datuk Fauzi Shaari 
explains that whether a suspect has the right to see a lawyer before investigation 
depends on the nature of the case and it is at the discretion of the police as they have 
the right to approve or object to a lawyer seeing the suspect. 125Further the late Suffian 
LP in deciding the aforementioned held in Ooi Ah Phua v Officer in Charge of 
Criminal Investigation, Kedah/Perlis 126 the law as it stands today: 
"With respect I agree that the right of an arrested person to consult his 
lawyer begins from the moment of arrest, but I am of the opinion that 
that right cannot be exercised immediately after arrest." 
[1975] 1 MLJ 93 who held at p 89 that Article 5(3) of our Constitution now guarantees this right and 
at the same time has converted into a constitutional provision 
124 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 [1966] USSC, where the courts held that to whittle down such 
constitutional safeguard should render the detention unlawful and the whole case against the accused 
should be thrown out. 
125 StarMag, Sunday 6 March 2005 
126 [ 1975] 2 MLJ 198, The subject in this case was arrested by the police on Dec 26, 1974 and was 
formally charged on Jan 07, 1975 for abetment in armed robbery. The appellant, the father of the 
subject, instructed solicitors and counsel attempted to see the subject but was unsuccessful in their 
application and subsequently the appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that ( 1) the 
right of the subject to consult and be defended by counsel of his choice conunenced immediately 
after his anest and (2) this right is an unqualified right and the denial of this right by the police had 
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With due respect, in light of the present criminal justice system, it is opined 
that the law as articulated by Suffian LP would be unacceptable 127 especially in light 
of the stigma attached to an accused person who is being detained for alleged terrorist 
activities, but most importantly is that a fundamental right of such importance 
enshrined in the Constitution if restricted 128 defeats the very fundamental norms of 
civil liberties. 
However, this is not the case as His Lordship Salleh Abbas LP in Theresa Lim 
Chin Chin put forth the question as to when a detainee arrested under section 7 3 of 
the !SA 1960 should be allowed to exercise his right under Article 5(3) of the Federal 
Constitution to consult a lawyer of his choice and unequivocally answered in line with 
the Federal Court decision in Ooi Alt Pluta v Officer in Charge, Criminal 
Investigations, Kedah/Perlis. In other words, the matter should best be left to the 
good judgment of the authority as and when such right might not interfere with police 
investigation. To show breach of Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution, an applicant 
has to show that the police had deliberately and with bad faith obstructed a detainee 
from exercising his right under the said Article. 
This proposition that the said right could even be delayed m cases of !SA 
detainees is very disturbing, for all the wrong reasons that the !SA 1960 projects, 
imagine what lawlessness would result if a detainee under the !SA 1960 has been 
denied his right under Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution and worst still it is left 
rendered the detention unlawful. The application having been dismissed in the High Court, the 
appellant appealed to the Federal Court 
127 Rights of Accused Person-Are Safeguards Being Reduced? Jerald Gomez (2004) IMLJ xx, (2004) 
1 MLJA 20, at p 6 disagrees with his lordship's decision on the point as it cannot stand the test of 
logic, reason or even the normal rules of interpretation. The author further expresses that a right that 
is deemed to exist but cannot be exercised is not a right at all and makes nonsense of this impmiant 
safeguard and right. 
128 Though a particular right can be restricted by an express provision in the Constitution, however in 
the instance, there is no such proviso expressly restricting the said right. 
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to the police for up to 60 days to decided when if such right granted would not 
interfere police investigation. 
In answering in the affirmative the courts have adopted a two fold approach in 
dealing with this fundamental issue in that although due recognition is given to the 
fact that the right to consult counsel begins right from the day of arrest, nevertheless, 
the courts have imposed certain legitimate restrictions to which reference is made to 
the guidelines enunciated though obiter of Syed Agil Barakbah J in Ramli bin Salleh 
v Inspector Yahya bin Hashim 129 which is constructive in the present discussion and 
thus divided in the following: 
II the right of an accused person remanded in police custody, to 
consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his own choice as 
embodied in clause (3) of Article 5 of the Constitution begins right 
from the day of his arrest even though police investigation has not yet 
been completed. " 
"On the other hand, the law also requires the police to carry out 
investigations in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of 
clause (1) of Article 5 with a view to bringing offenders to justice. It is 
in that respect and towards that end that the fundamental right of the 
accused to consult counsel of his own choice should be subject to 
certain legitimate restrictions which necessarily arise in the course of 
129 [1973] 1 MLJ 54, an application for habeas corpus came before the court. The prisoner in this case 
was arrested on gth Aug 72 by the police and was produced within 24 hours before a magistrate who 
on the application of the police ordered the prisoner to be remanded for a period of eleven days under 
section 117 of the CPC as he was satisfied that that police investigation would not be completed 
within 24 hours. On 9th Aug counsel for the prisoner who was retained by his father in law, the 
applicant in the instance, asked the police for permission to see him to which in rely the police said 
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police investigation, the main object being to ensure a proper and 
speedy trial in the court of law. " 
The learned judge in defining the scope of restriction held that it may relate to 
time and convenience of both the police and the person seeking the interview and as 
such, should not be subject to any abuse by either party, for instance, by the police in 
unreasonably delaying the interview or by counsel in demanding an interview at any 
time that suits him or by interference with investigation. 130However what was ailing 
in this case was the Federal Court's stand in refusing to make a ruling on a point of 
. I . h bl. 131 .c. h. h h 132 .d d law of such constderab e Importance to t e pu IC 10r w IC t ey const ere to 
be abstract matters or rather of academic interest. It should be pointed out that despite 
the circumstance of the case that the ruling was uncalled for, 133 nevertheless it is 
opined that the Federal Court in the instance should have made a ruling on this point 
regardless of the reasons made known 134 for it is in principle that the Federal Court is 
not bound by it own decision and therefore any ruling or opinion made could be made 
subject to the circumstance of each case appearing before them. 
that the counsel could only see the prisoner after their completion of investigation which was on 19th 
Aug. 
130 These restrictions was also recognised in Lee Mau Seng v Minister for Home Affairs, Singapore & 
Anor [1971) 2 M.L.J 137, where the learned Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin C.J expressed in obiter 
dicta that an arrested person is (under Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution) 'beyond a shadow of 
doubt entitled to this constitutional right granted to him by the authority who has custody of him 
after his arrest and this right must be granted to him within a reasonable time after his arrest'. 
Therefore following the learned Chief justice obiter, one can conclude that that the right to counsel 
should be allowed within a reasonable time after the arrest. 
131 Syed Agil Brakbah J made a ruling on this point 
132 A full bench of the Federal Court consisting ofH.T. Ong C.J, Suffian, Gill, Ali and H.S. Ong, F.J.J 
unanimously refused to give an opinion on this point. 
133 The solicitor upon the instruction of the applicant filed an originating motion for a writ of habeas 
corpus on 12th Aug however the prisoner was released on 14th Aug and the originating motion came 
before the court on 15 Aug and despite the subject matter of the originating motion ceased to exist 
the judge in considering importance of the points raised by counsel, moved on to make a ruling. 
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In taking cognisance of the above decision and in Ooi Ah Phua V Officer in 
Charge, Criminal Investigations Kedah Per/is, it is submitted that although the 
courts do recognise that an immediate right to counsel upon arrest exists, nevertheless 
iterated that this right can be reasonably delayed on several grounds. Therefore, delay 
was reasonable taking into account the nature of offence committed, time and place. 
Following which it would be timely to address the judgment of Suffian LP 135 
following the sentiments echoed by Syed Agil Barakbah J136 (though obiter) in the 
following paragraphs: 
"A balance must be struck between the right of the arrested person to 
consult his lawyer on the one hand and on the other the duty of the 
police to protect the public from wrongdoers by apprehending them 
and collecting whatever evidence exists against them. The interest of 
justice is more important as (sic) the interest of an arrested person and 
it is well-known that criminal elements are most of all deterred by the 
certainty of detection, arrest and punishment. "137 
134 The Federal Court under section 48 has no jurisdiction to determine abstract matters or matters of 
academic interest; that the judge when making the ruling was already functus officio; and that the 
prisoner was already released. 
135 Suffian LP in delivering his judgment agreed with the view adopted by Bhide J in Sundar Singh v 
Emperor, AIR 1930 Lahore 945 who said at p 947 that the right of a prisoner to have access to legal 
advise must of course be subject to such legitimate restrictions as may be necessary in the interests of 
justice in order to prevent any undue interference with the course of investigation. He further 
explains that a legal adviser cannot claim to have interviews with a prisoner at any time he chooses 
and if there are any good reasons to believe that a particular pleader has abused or is likely to abuse 
the privilege that pleader may be refused an interview and it is on the police to substantiate so. 
136 His Lordship Suffian LP in the instance held that it was reasonable for the police to deny counsel to 
interview the arrested person on Dec 30, 1974 bearing in mind that there had been a day light 
robbery committed in the heart of the state capital involving the use of a pistol and the loss of $ 
14,000/- to$ 15,000/- not to mention the loss of one life and that as many young men are prepared to 
go to any length in the pursuit of instant wealth, armed robberies are therefore quite cornn1on, and 
therefore justified the police to give access to counsel for the first time only on January 5, 1975 . 
137 Ibid at p 200 
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Further, Suffian LP in Ooi Ah Phua observed that it was reasonable 138 for 
the police to deny the accused his fundamental constitutional right for 6 days, it is 
emphasised that the constitutional right to counsel should be accorded to an accused 
person regardless of the fact that he is being detained and investigated for a serious 
crime and to delay even for 6 days this right on these fragile grounds would go against 
the very notion of the presumption of innocence 139 as the accused is taken to be 
i1mocent until proven guilty. To deny the right to counsel at the investigation stages 
where the presumption is opined being far greater to exist is evidence of extensive 
curtailment of the rights of an accused person and in the words of Cunlifee J in Sudha 
Sindhu Dey v Emperor: 140 
unless in certain offences persons are directed by the government 
to be tried by drumhead Court martial, it is of paramount importance 
that advocates should have access to their clients and should obtain all 
support they are entitled to look for in seeking such (sic) success. The 
more serious the offence the greater the need of the advocate's help .. . ' 
138 Syed Othman J in considering the issue of reasonableness held in Public Prosecutor v Mah Chuen 
Lim and Others [1975] 1 MLJ 95, at p 96 that in the absence of a prescribed time reference should 
be made to section 38 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, 1948, which applies to 
the Constitution (See Eleventh Schedule, were section 38 provides that when no time is prescribed 
or allowed within which anything shall be done, such thing shall be one with all convenient speed 
and as often as the prescribed occasion arises) where particular reference is made to ' such thing shall 
be done with all convenient speed' under the said section (A similar provision can be found in 
section 54(2) of the Interpretation Act 1967, which applies to legislation set out in section 2) The 
court therefore in the instance held that convenient speed would depend on the circumstances of each 
particular given case and therefore rejected the idea of providing a predetermined speed of 
convenient to all cases as it would be to rigid an application in the instance. 
139 Jerald Gomez at p 6 opines in disagreement that the type of crime, where it was committed, that 
young men are prepared to go to any length in the pursuit of wealth, that armed robberies are 
common, the subject matter and amount of the stolen goods or even proposition that criminal 
elements are most detened by the certainty of detection, arrest and punishment has anything to do 
with the constitutional right guaranteed under the Constitution. 
140 [1935] AIR Cal. 101 
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Therefore, the law in Malaysia is that the right to counsel does not exist 
immediately upon arrest, but left to the good judgment of the police or rather left to 
the unwary discretionary hands of the police to grant the said right on a balance of 
reasonable convenience. 
In Nasharuddin, the applicant was denied access to counsel and contested that 
the denial had impeded the applicant's solicitors from discharging their duties as they 
were unable to get clear instructions from their client. Although the court recognized 
that Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution does not expressly or impliedly provide 
in anyway the police the authority to deny detainees access to legal representation and 
that such fundamental liberty in the instance are never at the police discretion, 
nevertheless, held that when a detainee does exercises his right it would be left to the 
good judgment of the police 141 in the absence of any mala fide on the part of the 
police exercising such discretion and if such the case may be the onus of showing 
breach rested on the applicant. 142 
Further in Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Other 
Appeals, 143 the Federal Court in considering, inter alia, breach of Article 5(3) of the 
Federal Constitution and the effect of its breach, 144stressed that since detention orders 
141 In conformity with the decision in Ooi Ah Phua v Officer in Charge of Criminal Investigation, 
Kedah/Perlis [1975] I MLJ 93 
142 Suriyadi Halim Omar J held: The constitutional right of a detainee "to consult and be defended by a 
legal representative of his choice" as worded in Article 5(3) would be meaningless if he could simply 
be denied access by an administrator. However, following the decision in Theresa Lim Chin Chin v 
Inspector General of Police [ 1988] I MLJ 293, [ 1988] I LNS 132 SC, the time at which the detainee 
may exercise his right "to consult and be defended by a legal representative of his choice" has to be 
left to the 'good judgment' of the police. The onus of showing a breach of Article 5(3) of the Federal 
Constitution rested on the applicant 
143 [2002] 4 MLJ 449 
144 The evidence before their lordship were clear in that it was undeniable that the appellants were 
being denied any contact nor communication with their solicitor or family members throughout the 
period of detention despite futile written request made by the appellants solicitors for the said 
purpose to which the respondents argued that although such a right existed nevertheless that right is 
suspended throughout the maximum period of detention of 60 days and therefore were entitled under 
the law that throughout the said detention to go about their investigations without any form of 
interference and for this reason that the written request from applicants counsels were rejected and as 
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under section 8 of the !SA 1960 were made against all but one applicant, 145 the police 
must act promptly and professionally in their investigation, so as not to run down time 
as to when the appellants are allowed their fundamental right to consult counsel, 
which could be denied up to the maximum period of detention allowed in the pretext 
that investigation is still ongoing. 
The court in weighing the balance between the interest of the state on one 
hand and the interest of the detainees on the other, held that, in a11owing access only 
after the expiry of the appellants detention is conduct unreasonable and a clear 
violation of Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution, which supports the appellants 
contention 146 that the denial to the right counsel amounted to mala fide on the part of 
the police that the !SA 1960 was used for collateral purpose. 
The Court further dismissed the respondent's claim that they had absolute 
powers throughout the said 60 day detention to refuse access to counsel. 147 The Court 
emphasised that the !SA 1960 makes no provision as to abso lute denial of the right to 
counsel throughout the entire 60 day detention period and therefore, strongly criticise 
that to deny access at the earlier stages of detention is reasonable but to deny such 
fundamental right throughout the detention period makes a mockery of Article 5 (3) of 
the Federal Constitution. 148 
such should not be interpreted to mean an outright denial and therefore deny any form of bad faith on 
their part. 
145 Detention orders under section 8 of the !SA /960 were issued against the first, third, fourth and fifth 
appellants following their initial detention under section 73(3) of the !SA 1960. The second appellant 
was released on the fifty-second day of his detention. 
146 The Federal Court referred to Ooi Ah Pinta Phua v Officer in Charge of Criminal fnvestigation, 
Kedah/Perlis [1975] 1 MLJ 93 and Theresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v fnsp ector General of Police 
[ 1988] 1 MLJ 293 as the correct test in that the onus of proving breach rested on the applicant to 
show that there was mala fide on the part of the police to deliberately obstruct the right to counsel. 
147 Following Hashim bin Saud v Yahya bin Hashim & A nor [1977] 2 MLJ 116 
148 Atp516 
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However in Noor Ashid bin Sakib v Ketua Polis Negara 149the court held that 
there was no mala fide on the part of the police denying the right in the instance. Here 
the applicant who was a religious teacher at the Madrasah AI-Masriyah Simpang 
Rengam and a member of Parti Islam Malaysia was detained under the !SA 1960 
pending enquiries. 150 The issue before the court was whether, there was bad faith on 
the police in refusing to allow visitation by relatives and counsel pending 
investigation. The court in refusing an application of habeas corpus held the onus of 
proving breach of Article 5 (3) of the Federal Constitution was on the applicant to 
show that the police had deliberately and with bad faith obstructed the applicant from 
exercising his right under the aforesaid Article 151 and in the instance had failed to do 
so. It appeared that the refusal was due to pending ongoing but yet unfinished 
investigation and therefore not a denial of the right to counse1 152and for these 
reasons, 153 habeas corpus was refused. The applicant had failed to show that the that 
the respondent had acted in bad faith in deliberately obstructing the applicant from 
exercising his said right when investigation was yet to be completed 154 and therefore 
were of the opinion that access at this time should not be given unlike in the case of 
/55 Mohamad Ezam. 
However in respect of the above decision, it is expressed that there would be 
minimal or no harm at all , in at least, allowing the detainee to see his family . By 
149 [2002] 5 MLJ 22 
150 The applicant was detained under section 73 for more than 30 days but less than 60 days and there 
were no order of detention under section 8 made against the applicant. 
151 Though the court acknowledge that the applicant has an undeniable right to counsel nevertheless 
held that in the instance the said right was suspended, following Th eresa Lim Chin Chin & Ors v 
Inspector General of Police [ 1988] 1 MLJ 293 
152 Seep 34F-G 
153 It should be noted that in the instance the applicant had also failed to show that the detention was 
unlawful. Given that all procedural requirements had been met, the detention of the applicant for the 
period exceeding 30 days but yet not exceeding 60 days was clearly lawful according to the court. 
154 See enc 7 exh 'PS-I ' which the court upon perusing the exhibit of the letter by the police that any 
visitation by family may obstruct investigation held that it did not show any bad faith and should be 
accepted 
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denying any family visitation, may only cause emotional trauma on the family as they 
may not know the whereabouts and safety of their loved ones in detention. 
In Abdul Ghani Haroon v Ketua Polis Negara & Anor Application 156the 
applicants who were members of the political party Parti Keadilan Nasional were 
separately an·ested under section 73(1) of the !SA 1960. 157The police denied access to 
family members, lawyers and members of the SUHAKAM whom in particular 
pursuant to section 4 (2) (d) of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 
(Act 597), the Commission, in discharging its function, visit places of detention in 
accordance with procedures as prescribed by the Jaws relating to the places of 
detention and to make necessary recommendations. 
The court held that, apart from the non-compliance of the provisions of the 
!SA 1960 and of the Federal Constitution, 158 further held that it was unacceptable and 
in the instance deliberate and unreasonable on the part of the police to deny access to 
family members for almost 40 days on grounds that by allowing access to family 
members would impede police investigation. 159m fact Mohd Hishamudin J states that, 
to deny such access for such a period is cruel, inhuman and oppressive not only to the 
applicant but to their families. 160 It is iterated that such denial of access to visitation, 
especially in regards to the right to counsel is a gross violation of a fundamental right 
enshrined in the Federal Constitution. 
Thus, the court stressed that such denial of right in the instance is a clear 
manifestation ofunlawfulness on the part of the police in exercising their discretion as 
155 In the case of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals [2002] 4 
MLJ 449, access was not given until the expiry date of detention 
156 [2001] 2 MLJ 689 
157 Both application (the other being GobalaKrishnan a/1 Nagappan) were heard together by consent of 
both parties 
158 !d. 704, the provisions include non-compliance with sections 73(1), (3)(a), (b), (c) of the JSA /960, 
and non-compliance with Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution. 
159 The joint letter of the Inspector General and the Director of Special Branch (translated) clearly state 
that, any visitation fi"om both the family and counsel would impeded on going police investigation. 
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regards must be adhered to the Federal Constitution, which is the highest law of the 
land, and not the !SA I 960, as it is at the police station that the real trial begins. 
Therefore, such fundamental rights should not be enforced blindly but be interpreted 
and carried out as humanely as possible. 161 
Although the decision of the Federal Court is most welcoming, nevertheless, 
the suggestion that a visitation by a counsel if permitted, could be monitored in the 
presence of the police is definitely contradictory to the principle of legal professional 
privilege, where free communication between a lawyer and his detained client is a 
fundamental right which is essential in a democratic society, and above all, in the 
. f 162 most senous o cases. 
It is submitted that the proposition, that the police are entitled to refuse visit by 
counsel in the pretext that if granted, would be prejudicial to their investigation, defies 
logic for a right of such constitutional stature, but most importantly, in the given 
context, such refusal by the police implies a presumption of guilt not only on the part 
of the detainee at the very beginning of the criminal process, but also extends to the 
detainee's legal counsel, whom is regarded as an officer of the court. It is emphasised 
that in no circumstances will the presence of counsel during police investigation 
obstruct police investigation, 163 but rather, it promotes justice in the sense that, there 
160 Jd. 703H, 704B 
16 1 Mohd Hishamudin at p 707B 
162 S v Switzerland [ 1991] 14 E.H.R.R 670 
163 It is reiterated that it would be very rare a case a legal counsel impeding police investiga tion, 
however, one could quickly point out at the high occurrence of abuse of police powers, which, would 
likely to cause miscarriage of justice. Human Rights and Administration of Criminal Justice in India, 
Prof S.P. Srivastava in Human Rights and Criminal Justice Administration in India Prod (Dr) 
Nomjahan bava (ed) (2000) Delhi, Upal Publishing House p 134 at p 141 stated that "the main 
culprits of human rights abuses are police, prisons and the State ... Police in our context has a long 
history of law-breaking. Its record of little regard of human rights is not a thing of the past; it is 
flourishing now as ever before. Our police has (sic) perfected a torture technology of a horrible and 
honendous kind. It consists of several ingenious ways of torture and tyranny, all in the name of 
crime prevention and control. In the arrogance of authority the policemen often become the worst 
violators of law. In the garb of combating criminality, the police take (sic) law into their own hands 
and systematically violate the basic rights of individuals and groups of people belonging to weaker 
sections- those who are unresourced and under privileged." 
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would be a share balance of power between the police and the accused in the presence 
of his counsel and it is reiterated that, to thwart otherwise, is akin to referring a legal 
counsel in the instance an accomplice to the alleged offence being investigated for. 
The police should be mindful that a counsel is an Advocate and Solicitor of 
the High Court of Malaya, he is a practitioner, meaning an authorised person, holding 
a valid practise cetiificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Act I 956 and therefore an 
officer of the court. Therefore, it would be highly unlikely that the counsel would 
impede police investigation, for counsel upholds and strives for justice, and in the 
instance would be timely to gesture the statement of Arthur Goldberg J in Escobedo v 
Illinois 164 in dealing with an accused person's right to consult counsel, held: 
"No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is 
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and 
exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart 
the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is 
something very wrong with that system" 
Although the accused person is well protected under Part II of the Federal 
Constitution, nevertheless, with the abundance of anti-terrorism laws, and in 
particular the !SA I 960 effectively cmiails the right to be presumed innocent. The lack 
of effective safeguards under the !SA I 960 as oppose to the CPC is evident; that the 
!SA detainees may succumb to constant wide range of abuses. Under the CPC, an 
arrested person is to be produced before a magistrate within twenty-four hours, and 
thereafter, any form of further detention is made only with the authority of the 
164 [1964] 378 U.S.478 
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magistrate for no more than 14 days for investigation. 165 However under the !SA 
1960, the police can detain a suspect for up to 60 days without any judicial 
authorisation for such detention. This is clear disregard to fundamental due process of 
law which if not observed, may infringe procedural rights such as the right to a fair 
trial and the right to counse1. 166 
Apart from the non-observance of the procedural rights, Human Rights Watch 
observes that the !SA detainees are held under extreme conditions of detention 167 
falling short of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 168 This 
system of preventive detention which curtails judicial and procedural safeguards may 
further lead to detainees being subject to physical abuse and torture, in which Human 
Rights Watch observes that such abuses are commonly inflicted on !SA detainees. 169 
It is reiterated that what makes the !SA 1960 the number one enemy of the 
presumption of innocence is that the provisions therein especially section 8, provides 
the Executive absolute power, without any recourse for judicial review to deprive a 
person of his or her liberty indefinitely without trial solely for preventive reasons. 
Further, in the absence of effective safeguards, especially in relation to the powers of 
the Advisory Board, incongruously a necessary creature within the scheme of the !SA 
1960, taken together with the substandard legal interpretation of Article 5 (3) of the 
Federal Constitution in regards to the exercise of an accused right to counsel makes it 
165 Section I 17 of the CPC 
166 Professor Wu Min Aun, School of Law, Northern Territory University, Australia., Keynote Address 
at Conference on Human Rights and the Administration of the Law: Human Rights and Law 
Enforcement (Kuala Lumpur 9-10 September 2003) ( http://www.cdu.edu.au/law/staff/wu/wu2.htrn) 
167 The condition of detention cells according to former detainees is that the cells are usually 8 feet 
square, with no mattress, no pillow and no bedclothes. There are no windows and a I 00-watt bulb 
was on 24 hours a day. Human Rights Watch, Vol. 16, No.7 (C), at pp 30-32 
168 !d. 32, pursuant to Articles 10, 11 and 19 of the UN. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners 
169 Human Rights Watch, Country Summary (January 2006) (www.hrw.org). For further reading of 
abuses against ISA detainees, see: Human Rights Watch, Vol. 16, No.7 (C), at pp. 20-22 
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more conclusive, as to why the !SA 1960 is regarded a potential threat to fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Federal Constitution. 
Although to some extent the powers under the !SA 1960 in relation to police 
detention under section 73 has been curtailed and is now put under the microscope of 
judicial purview, but in the overall, much is left desired as the presumption of 
innocence under the !SA 1960 is effectively curtailed. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The !SA 1960 over the years since its inception has been used in manifold. It is a 
reflection of the potency of the Government to suppress fundamental rights in times 
of necessity, especially in the fight against terrorism. Whether or not detainees under 
the !SA 1960 have actually committed an illegal act will not be known until they are 
brought to trial in court of law. It is further observed that ordinary laws such as the 
CPC offer far better protection as compared to an accused person held under the !SA 
1960. The justification may lie on the severity of the offence under the !SA 1960 that 
warrants some fom1 of curtailment of fundamental rights. 
Although such may be the case, the law should balance that need to protect the 
security and welfare of the State against the protection of fundamental liberties. 
However, this is not the case here as it is observed that the effective removal of 
judicial review of section 8 orders, the lack of sound judicial reasoning on judicial 
review of such orders by the judiciary and the denial of the right to counsel are all 
testamentary of gradual curtailment of fundamental rights, specifically the 
presumption of innocence at the expense of protecting the security of the State. 
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Thus, it seems that the integrity of our criminal justice system is susceptible to 
terrorism laws. It is observed that laws are passed as effective measures to provide a 
safe environment for every citizen from harm, but terrorism laws and specifically the 
!SA I 960 on the other hand, instils fear on every Malaysian citizen. The reason is 
obvious; detention without trial, wide practise of abuse by law enforcement 
authorities and the lack of effective safeguards as a whole, only gains fear and 
condemnation for such laws. 
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CHAPTERS 
ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS IN ENGLAND & WALES 
5.1 Introduction 
The comparative study is in relation to the prevailing anti-terrorism laws in 
England & Wales. 170 It is observed that the Federal Constitution of Malaysia is 
founded on the Westminster model of England and Wales and therefore to some 
extent, has inherited principles of English common law, which encompasses 
fundamental principles of natural justice and to which, has been streamLined within 
our Malaysian legal system.171 Therefore, it goes without saying that fundamental 
British traditions of civil liberties and due process has been well incorporated within 
the legal systems of the members states of the Commonwealth, including Malaysia, 
whom were once ruled by the British empire. 
Although the legal system ofEngland and Wales has always been viewed as a 
yardstick for protection of fundamental rights and liberties, however, much has 
changed since the inception of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 
(hereinafter the 'ATCSA 2001') and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (hereinafter 
the 'PTA 2005 '). The inception of the ATCSA 2001 which introduces indefinite 
detention exclusively applying only to foreign terrorist suspects and the PTA 2005 
which introduces control order indiscriminately, potentially depart from the well 
established traditional concepts of due process, which are regarded as norms of the 
criminal justice system of England and Wales. 
170 Both England and Wales share a common legal system. For further reading of the historical 
development of the United Kingdom in relation to Wales, see; Wade and Bradley: Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, Edited by A.W. Bradley & Keith Ewing (11th Edition) ELBS pp 38-39 
171 Kekatong Sdn Bhd v Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 378, following Che Ani !tam v Public 
Prosecutor [1984] I MLJ 113 and Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 64, at p 71 
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5.2 A Human Rights Culture 
England and Wales to some degree is respected as a human rights culture and 
such was the conviction placed by the Government on the importance of human rights 
within its legal framework that it decided to pass the Human Rights Act 1998 despite 
having ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, thereby incorporating the 
Convention rights into domestic law. 172 The Convention treaty made major impact in 
that it always had an influence in the outcome of political and judicial decisions of 
contracting states and as such, it warrants a brief mention of the framework of the 
Convention treaty. 
The significance of the Convention is that it provides any person 173 a right of 
individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights 174 and the decision of the 
Court is final and binding. 175 The Court's judgments are more than merely declaratory 
in nature, despite the Court not having the jurisdiction to quash the decision of a 
national authority, or to overturn a criminal conviction. 176Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that the contracting States are under an obligation to abide by the decision of 
the Court in any case to which they are parties. 177It is observed that the Convention 
broke new ground in international law in three important respects; firstly, it adopted a 
principle of collective enforcement of human rights; secondly, the inclusion of a right 
of an individual petition and finally, the establishment of supervisory machinery to 
172 Lord Hope in R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene [ 1999] 3 WLR 972 at para. 838 said that although the 
Human Rights Act 1998 is not yet in force, the vigorous public debate that accompanied its passage 
through Parliament has already had a profound effect on thinking about issues of human rights. It is 
now plain that the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into our domestic 
law will subject the entire legal system to a fundamental process of review and, where necessary, 
reform by the judiciary. 
173 This may include non-governmental organisation or group of individuals 
174 Article 34 of the Convention, which is subject to exhausting all other revenues pursuant to Article 
35 (/)of the Convention 
175 Article 46(1) of the Convention 
176 Ben Emerson QC & Andrew Ashworth QC, Sweet & Maxwell2001 at p 3 
177 This obligation is enforceable by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe which has 
the task of supervising the execution of the Court's judgment under Article 46(2) of the Convention 
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interpret, apply and enforce the Convention. 178 The influence of the Convention on its 
contracting States grew in stature that it was treated as a constitutional instrument of 
European public order in the field of human rights. 179 
Although the Convention embodies a comprehensive framework of 
fundamental rights which is well protected, nevertheless, it also provides contracting 
States the power to derogate from its obligation arising under thjs Convention, in time 
of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. 180 This is where it 
becomes apparent that the rights reflected in the Convention especially in relation to 
Article 5 of the Convention are not absolute 181 and can be derogated in times of 
emergency, but the prohibition against torture under Article 3 of the Convention 
cannot be derogated. 182 England and Wales had in the past in relation to the conflict 
with Northern Ireland, derogated itself from obligation arising under the Convention 
183 N . 1· h f h . . in particular to Article 5. ow m 1g t o t e circumstances permitted by the 
ATCSA 200J 184that requires a necessary derogation in order to make the ATCSA 2001 
compatible with Convention obligations 185 and with the Human Rights Act 1998. 186 
178 Ben Emerson QC & Andrew Ashworth QC, Sweet & Maxwe112001 at p 5-7 
179 Cluysostomos, Papacluysostomou and Loizidou v Turkey [1991] 68 D.R.216 at 242 
180 Article 15 of the Convention 
181 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Neither Just nor Effective, Indefinite Detention Without Trial 
in the United Kingdom Under Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (June 24, 
2004) Human Rights Watch, at p. 5 
182 Ibid 
183 In Brogan v United Kingdom [ 1988] 11 EHRR 117, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
the 4 days detention for interrogation without access to a judge violated Article 5(3) which required 
that anyone arrested shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power. However the government entered derogation pursuant to Article 15 and 
justified that the conflict in Northern Ireland was an emergency threatening the life of the nation and 
the provisions under the Prevention of Terrorism (Tempormy Provisions) Act 1989 which allowed 
the police to detain for up to 7 days were necessary. 
184 The Convention only allows Immigration detention pursuant to Article 5 (1) (f) which provides that 
detention is only lawful where action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
185 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Loc. cit, The UK government formally derogated from Article 
5(1) (f) of the Convention on December 18, 2001 and at the same day informed the United Nations 
Secretary General that a public emergency within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights existed in the UK. 
186 Ibid, section I (2) Human Rights Act /998 
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5.3 Anti-Terrorism Laws in England and Wales 
It is observed that although England and Wales do not have a written 
constitution unlike Malaysia, nevertheless, it has a set of legal rules 187 whereby in 
terms of legal effect, an Act of Parliament is supreme. 188 Therefore, by virtue of its 
prevailing stature within the laws of England and Wales, Parliament apari from the 
ATCSA 2001 and the PTA 2005, had passed before, various anti-terrorism laws in the 
.c II . 189 10 owmg: 
i) Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939 
ii) Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 1973-1998 
iii) Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974-2001 
iv) Terrorism Act 2000 
It has to be mentioned that the war on terrorism m England and Wales is not 
something new as it has been a permanent facet within the political arena of the 
United Kingdom 190 and which to a certain degree, what Malaya then, experienced 
during the insurgency of the communist party. 191 Although in the past these counter 
terrorism laws were temporary in nature, 192 the government decided to review its 
stand, as the war against terror no longer reflected a political fight against the IRA but 
187 These sources of legal rules include Acts of Parliament, Judicial Precedent or Case law, Customs 
and Constitutional Conventions. For further reading see Wade and Bradley: Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, Edited by A.W . Bradley & Keith Ewing (I lth Edition) ELBS pp 13-33 
188 fd. 69. This proposition that Parliament is supreme is well founded in the famous passage of A.Y. 
Dicey, who states that; Parliament has under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake 
any law whatever; and further that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as a having 
a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. 
189 Note: Measures i), ii) and ii) are temporary in nature and were passed during the insurgence of the 
IRA in Britain to which some of the measures where quick response to Birmingham pub bombings in 
1974 and Bloody Sunday in 1972. Clive Walker, Terrorism and Criminal Justice: Past, Present and 
Future (2004) Crim.L.R. pp 55-57 
190 Ibid 
191 See sub chapter 4.2: Tenorism Laws in Malaysia 
192 Id 
60 
a global threat, 193 which therefore required a permanent and forceful legislation. 
Although the Terrorism Act 2000 was not passed in the aftermath of the September 
11, 2001 attacks by al Qa'ida, however the ensuing legislation was; the ATCSA 2001 
and the PTA 2005 was a reflection of Parliament's hard stand in tackling terrorism, 
more so in light of the London bombings by terrorist. 
5.4 Presumption oflnnocence under the ATCSA 2001 
It cannot be denied that the ACTSA 2001 which was passed on 14 December, 
2001 was an immediate response by the Government in the aftermath of the horrific 
September 11 attack. 194 Among the most controversial provision of the ATCSA 
2001 195 that contravenes the presumption of innocence is Part 4 of the Act, which 
provides for detention without trial of foreign persons. The Secretary of State in 
defence of the offending provision stresses that; so long as the public emergency 
subsists, where a person is suspected of terrorism but cannot cmTently be removed 
and for whom a criminal prosecution is not an option, believe that it is necessary and 
proportionate to provide for extended detention, pending removal. 196 Such is the 
magnitude of harm that may be potentially inflicted on an accused person under such 
telTOrism laws that it warrants reciting the relevant provision in full below. 
193 Legislation against terrorism (Cm.4178, London, 1998) 
194 H. Fenwick, The Anti terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (2002) 65 M.L.R. 724 
195 The ATCSA 2001 has altogether 14 parts. Part 1 deals with Terrorism Property, Part 2 deals with 
Freezing Orders, Part 3 deals with Disclosure of Information, Part 5 Race and Religion, Part 6 deals 
with Weapons of Mass Destmction, Part 7 deals with Security of Pathogens and Toxins, Part 8 deals 
with Security of Nuclear Industry, Part 9 deals with Aviation Security, Part 10 deals with Police 
Powers, Part 11 deals with Retention of Communications Data, Part 12 deals with Bribery and 
Corruption, Part 13 deals with the Third Pillar of the European Union, Dangerous Substances, 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 and Terrorism Act 2000 
(http://www .opsi .gov. uklacts/acts200 1/20010024. htrn) 
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5.4.1 Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 
Section 21 Suspected international terrorist: certificate 
(1) The Secretary of State may issue a certificate under this section in respect of a 
person if the Secretary of State reasonably-
(a) believes that the person's presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national 
security, and 
. . 197 (b) suspects that the person IS a terronst 
Section 23 Detention: 
(1) A suspected international terrorist may be detained under a provision specified in 
subsection (2) despite the fact that his removal or departure from the United 
Kingdom is prevented (whether temporarily or indefinitely) by-
(a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an international agreement, or 
(b) a practical consideration 
(2) The provisions mentioned in subsection (1) are-
(a) paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (detention of 
persons liable to examination or removal), and 
(b) paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation) 
196 Secretary of State for the Home Department of 18 November 2003 , Home Department-Anti 
TelTorism, Crime and Security Act (Detentions), Hansard, Column 27WS 
197 Section 2 I (2) provides terrorist under subsection ( l )(b) to mean a person who-
( a) is or has been concemed in the comn1ission, preparation or instigation of acts of intemational 
te!Torism 
(b) is a member of or belongs to an intemational te!Torist group or 
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Therefore pursuant to section 21 ATCSA 2001, the Secretary of State is 
empowered to certify a foreigner as a suspected terrorist on grounds of reasonable 
suspicion falling short of real evidence and upon satisfying himself, may order 
detention pursuant to section 23 ATCSA 2001. It is observed that the ATCSA 2001 
provides the Executive the power to certify and detain a terror suspect indefinitely, a 
similar power enjoyed by the Home Minister under section 8 of the !SA 1960. It is 
dispiriting that such powers are left to be exercised by the Executive rather than the 
judiciary, who should be the final arbiter in determining any form of preventive 
detention, which potentially infringe the presumption of innocence. 
Further any evidence gathered against the suspected terrorist is regarded as 
matters of national security and are deemed classified. Therefore a suspect who is 
certified under section 21 of the ATCSA 2001 as terrorist on such classified evidence 
cannot be successfully prosecuted and are therefore trapped in limbo. 198 
It is further observed that there exist an apparent distinction between section 
23 of the ATCSA 2001 and section 8 of the !SA 1960. In relation to the proviso of 
section 23 of the ATCSA 2001, detention without trial only applies to foreigners and 
not nationals alike, therefore there is an element of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, however, the same cannot be said of section 8 of the !SA 1960, which 
although does not expressly provide so, but it is taken to apply indiscriminately. 
The justification for such powers and the application thereof to specific targets 
under Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 is based on the proposition that there were many non-
UK nationals in the UK who posed a threat to national security and whom on grounds 
of reasonable suspicion believed to be involved in international terrorism but falling 
(c) has links with an international terrorist group 
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short of any admissible evidence for prosecution. 199Further, any means of deportation 
may seemingly be impossible for fear of possible torture upon returning to their home 
country or that no other country was willing to admit them. This proposition is a 
reflection of the European Court of Human Rights decision in Chalal v United 
Kingdom 200in which the European Comt rejected the Home Secretary's deportation 
order on grounds that it infringed protection accorded under Article 3 of the 
Convention which provides that, no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman 
degrading treatment or punishment. The European Court went to state that this 
protection under Article 3 of the Convention was far wider than that provided by 
Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of 
201 Refugees. 
5.4.2 Safeguards: A Reflection of the Presumption oflnnocence 
Although sections 21 and 23 of the ATCSA 2001 operate to the detriment of the 
foreign detainee as they may be held indefinitely, however, there are inherent schemes 
of safeguards which reflect the operation of the presumption of innocence under the 
ATCSA 2001. 
198 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Neither Just nor Effective, Indefinite Detention Without Trial 
in the United Kingdom Under Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (June 24, 
2004) Human Rights Watch, at p. 6 
199 http ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-terrorism%2C Crime and Security Act 2001 
200 [ 1996] 23 EHRR 403 , Mr Chalal was an Indian citizen and who was ;n active Sikh separatist whom 
on this ground the Home Secretary decided to deport him as his continued presence was not 
conducive to the public good. He resisted deportation on the grow1d inter alia that if returned to India 
he would face real risk of death, or of torture in custody contrary to Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
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5.4.2.1 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (hereinafter the 'SIAC') was 
established in light of the landmark decision in Chalal. This case reflects the 
significance of Convention rights and obligations on contracting States, in particular 
to Article 3 of the Convention which cannot be derogated in times of emergency. The 
function of the SIAC is to review deportation cases involving national security and 
hence regarded as a special tribunal202 for the purpose of the ATCSA 200. Relatively, 
the SIAC reflects the Advisory Board under the !SA 1960 as both bodies provide an 
opportunity for the detainee to be heard, hence, it reflects the observance of 
presumption of innocence. 
However, the SIAC operates 111 a system of dual hearings and legal 
representation unlike the Advisory Body under the !SA 1960. The composition of the 
SIAC is statutorily specified,203 in which, the proceedings are heard by a panel of 
three members which include; a High Court judge, who nom1ally presides as the 
Chairman, a former or current Chief Adjudicator or a legally qualified member of the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal and a former or current legally qualified member of the 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. Therefore, the composition of the SIAC and the 
appointment of the Chairman by the Lord Chancellor, taken together with its 
membership of equal representation204 negate any political influence the Secretary of 
State may exert in the proceedings before the SIAC.205 
201 !d. 80 
202 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Neither Just nor Effective, Indefinite Detention Without Trial 
in the United Kingdom Under Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (June 24, 
2004) Human Rights Watch, at p. 7 
203 As amended by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
204 The membershjp includes 22 judicial members, 13 legal members and 13 Jay members. The United 
Kingdom Parliament, Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs Seventh Report 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmconst/323/323.06.htm) 
205 Ibid 
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The SIAC provides for both closed and open hearings depending on the nature 
of the evidence to be heard. As such, each detainee is represented by a special 
advocate and by his own legal representative of his choice. 206 The justification for a 
twofold representation is that when the SIAC sits on closed hearings, only the special 
advocate is granted security clearance before the SIAC to review the classified 
evidence which forms the basis of the certification under section 2I ATCSA 200I, 
from which the detainee and his legal representative of his choice are excluded. 
Further, the special advocate is not allowed to discuss the case with the detainee or his 
legal representative unless a clearance has been obtained first from the SIAC. 
However, in regards to non-classified evidence which are heard in.open hearings, both 
the detainee and his choice oflegal representative are permitted to attend. 207 
Although comparatively the SIAC provides a far better procedural safeguard 
for a detainee to challenge their detention order made under the A TCSA 200 I than that 
provided for under the Advisory Board of the !SA I 960, however the SIAC on its 
own, Jacks effective procedural safeguards as access to classified evidence which 
fom1s the basis of the certification issued under section 2I of the ATCSA 200I is 
denied to a detainee and his choice of legal representative. The purpose of the SIAC is 
to provide an opportunity for a detainee to effectively challenge his detention made 
pursuant to section 2I ATCSA 200I and this is only possible if the detainee and his 
legal representative are allowed access to the very evidence which forms the basis of 
the certification order. 
206 Human Rights Watch, Loc. Cit. 
207 ibid 
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5.4.2.2 Public Emergency Requirement under Article 15 of the Convention 
Section I (2) of the Human Rights Acts 1998 allows the government to 
derogate from its obligations arising under the Convention pursuant to Article 15 of 
the Convention which states that in time of war or other public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from 
its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of this situation. This enables the Government to derogate itself from some of the 
rights and freedoms without violating the Convention208 and as such, any derogation 
entered must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 209 The European Court 
of Human Rights states that, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for 
the fair balance between the demand of the general interest of the Community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual's human rights. 21 0 
Therefore, in order for any contracting State to derogate lawfully from rights 
and freedoms arising under the Convention, 211 the precondition is that there must be 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Although the Government of 
England and Wales have absolute dictation as to the public emergency requirement, 
as only they have access to classified evidence, nevertheless in the instance, it is 
observed that they had failed to satisfying the public emergency requirement on 
several factors, which among others include; public emergency requirement under 
Article 15 of the Convention is an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which 
affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the 
208 John Wadham & Helen Mountfield, Blackstone 's Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 (2"d ed) 
Blackstone Press Limited (2000) at p. 25 
209 /d. l8 
210 Soering v United Kingdom [ 1989] 11 ECHRR 439 at para. 89 
211 Apart from the Convention the precondition also applies to the ICCPR pursuant to Article 4( I). 
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community of which the State is composed;212that no other contracting party had 
lodged a derogation since 2001, apart from the Government of England and Wales; 
the lawfulness of the derogation from Article 5(1) of the Convention which 
discriminates on grounds of nationality under Article 14 of the Convention as 
indefinite detention only applied to foreigners; and that it had sufficient laws to 
combat terrorism without further need for the enactment of the ATCSA 2001. 213 
Although the SIAC had acknowledge that there was public emergency within 
the meaning of Article 15 of the Convention, as they had access to both c.lassified and 
non-classified evidence in arriving to that conclusion, nevertheless, there was all 
round criticisms214 and successful applications made by detainees against the 
derogation which eventually lead to the Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 being removed. 
212 Lawless v Ireland [1961] I ECHR I, the European Court upon examining the justification of the 
Government that there was a public emergency held that there was no violation and accordingly the 
Irish Government were justified. 
213 For further reading see: Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Neither Just nor Effective, Indefinite 
Detention Without Trial in the United Kingdom Under Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 (June 24, 2004) Human Rights Watch, at pp. 7-10 
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5.4.2.3 Effective Judicial Review 
A series of legal challenges were made in relation to the Home Secretary's 
powers under Part 4 which was argued as being incompatible with the UK's 
obligations under the Convention. In A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent), X (FC) and another 
(FC) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent),215 
the nine appellants216 who were certified by the Home Secretary under section 21 as 
suspected terrorist and subsequently detained under section 23 of the ATCSA 2001 
challenged before the House of Lords a decision of the Court of Appeal, which 
overturned the SIAC's ruling that there was a state of emergency threatening the life 
f 1 . 217 o t 1e nation. 
The ruling of the nme Law Lords21 8 was most welcoming as the majority, 
including Lord Bingham clearly held that section 23 of the ATCSA 2001 was 
incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the Convention as it was disproportionate and 
allowed detention of suspected international terrorists in a way that it discriminates on 
grounds of nationality or immigration status.219 Lord Nicholls observed that indefinite 
214 Privy Counselor Review Committee, "Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Review," para. 25, the 
Newton Conmuttee called for replacing the Part 4 powers which allow detention of foreigners. 
215 (2004] UKHL 56 
216 All appellants share a common characteristic in that all are foreign nationals. 
217 The appellants argued that their detention was unlawful as it was inconsistent with Convention 
obligations which were binding on the United Kingdom and that the derogation lodged was 
ineffectual to justify detention and that Part 4 of the ATCSA 200 I was incompatible with the 
Convention. Further the SIC in its earlier ruling held that that the ATCSA 200 /was unjustifiably 
discrinunatory against foreign nationals as the same did not apply to UK nationals. However on this 
point, the Human Rights Watch observes that the ATCSA 2001 was discrin1inatory on grounds of 
nationality seemed flawless and was debunked when eight UK nationals were arrested by anti 
terrorism police under the ATCSA 2001, which points that the ATCSA 200 I applies indiscrinUnately 
regardless of nationality. (June 24, 2004) 
218 The case was heard by a panel of nine law lords rather than the usual five due to its constitutional 
importance. The law lords comprised Lord Bingham, Lord Nicholls, Lord Hoffman, Lord Hope, 
Lord Scott, Lord Rodger, Lord Walker, Baroness Hale of Richmond, and Lord Carswell 
219 para 73 
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imprisonment without charge or trial is anathema in any country which observes the 
rule oflaw. 220 
The decision of the Law Lords prompted an immediate action by the 
Government to repeal the Part 4 powers under the ATCSA 2001 especially in relation 
to section 23 detention orders. However, although indefinite detention under section 
23 was repealed, nevertheless, the Government replaced them with a system of 
control orders under the PTA 2005, which applied indiscriminately. 
5.4.2.4 Parliamentary Scrutiny 
Over and above what has been aforementioned as being effective safeguards 
against potential abuse of power by the Executive, another effective form of safeguard 
is the scrutiny of Parliament of the ATCSA 2001, which should be applauded as the 
!SA 1960 is not subject to the same by our Parliament. It is within the inherent scheme 
of the ATCSA 2001 that the Part 4 of the Act is subject to additional aru1Ual review by 
a member of the House of Lords, notably a Law Lord, 221 as well as periodic 
consideration by Parliament apart from review for human rights compliance by the 
Joint Human Rights Committee ofParliament. 222The Law Lord is empowered within 
his mandate to ensure that the detention powers under Part 4 are exercised in a 
manner consistent with the said Act.223 This form of scrutiny exercised by Parliament 
ensures that there exist a form of check and balance of the powers exercised by the 
Executive, but most importantly it reflects that the presumption of innocence is 
observed to some degree as the liberty of an individual is at stake. 
220 para. 74 
221 Currently by Lord Carlile 
222 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Neither Just nor Effective, Indefinite Detention Without Trial 
in the United Kingdom Under Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (June 24, 
2004) Human Rights Watch, at p. 17 
223 Ibid 
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5.5 The Presumption of Innocence under the PTA 2005 
Although the decision of the House of Lords in A (FC) and others (FC) 
(Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respomlent/ 24 was 
encouraging as it lead to Parliament repealing the powers under Part 4 of the ATCSA 
2001 in relation to indefinite detention of foreign suspected terrorist,225 however, the 
decision prompted the passage of the PTA 2005. 226 The PTA 2005 effectively replaced 
the Part 4 detention orders under the ATCSA 2001 with control orders, which 
potentially contravene the presumption of innocence. Amnesty International observes 
that the UK authorities were wrong in 2001 when they passed the ATCSA 2001 and 
are wrong now in regards to the passing of the PTA 2005. The Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill contravenes the spirit, if not the letter of the Law Lords 
judgment.227These control orders are designed to restrict or prevent any further 
involvement by individuals indiscriminately in such activities22 8whether domestic or 
internationa1.229 Human Rights Watch observes that the powers vested with the 
Secretary of State to impose control orders on the basis of reasonable suspicion 
224 [2004] UKHL 56 
225 First Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section I4(3) of the Prevention of TeiTorism 
Act 2005, 2"d February 2006, at p.I 
226 The Act received its Royal Assent on March II, 2005, Third Commons debate 
(http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2005-03-I 0.1854.3) 
227 UK: The Prevention of TeiTorism Bill is a grave threat to human rights and the rule of law, 
Amnesty International Press Release: 28 February 2005 
228 Explanatory Notes to Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Crown Copyright 2005 
229 Section I (9) defines involvement in teiTorism related activity as any one or more of the following-
( a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of teiTorism 
(b) conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts or which is 
intended to do so 
(c) conduct which gives encouragement to the comnlission, preparation or instigation of such 
acts, or which is intended to do so 
(d) conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed to be 
involved in tenorism related activity 
and for the purpose of this subsection it is immaterial whether the acts of teiTorism in question are 
specific acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism generally 
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founded on secret evidence and with the lack of procedural safeguards seriously 
undermine among others; the presumption of innocence.230 
Therefore, it warrants examining these control orders in detail, which is provided 
under sections 1-9 of the PTA 2005.23 1 The said Act provides two distinct control 
orders which are derogating and non-derogating orders. 232 In relation to derogating 
orders, these are made by the court on the application from the Secretary of State,233 
whereas in regards to non-derogating orders, the Home Secretary must seek the 
court's pem1ission first to make such orders. Emphasise would be in relation to non-
derogating orders rather than derogating orders which, as reported by Lord Carlile has 
not been made thus far. 234 As such non-derogating orders made by the Secretary of 
State may potentially contravene the presumption of innocence, despite the inherent 
mechanism of full hearing in a court of law with an appeal lying therein.235 
230 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Commentary on Prevention ofTerrorism Bill 2005, March I, 
2005, atp. 2 
231 In summary, the sections are as follows: section I deals with power to make control orders, section 
2 deals with making of non derogating control orders, section 3 deals with supervision by court of 
making of non derogating control orders, section 4 deals with power of court to make derogating 
control orders, section 5 deals with arrest and detention pending derogating control order, section 6 
deals with duration of derogating control orders, section 7 deals with modification, notification and 
proof of order, section 8 deals with criminal investigations after making of control order and section 
9 deals with offences. 
232 However, in the event of any urgency on the matter, the permission to seek first the courts 
indulgence can be passed, but the Home Secretary must refer thereafter immediately the court's 
confirmation. Explanatory Notes to Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Crown Copyright 2005 
233 Section 4 of the PTA 2005 
234 First Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005, (2"d Febmary 2006) at p. 16 
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5.5.1 Section 2 of the PTA 2005: Non-Derogating Orders 
It is reiterated that non-derogating orders are made by the Secretary of State 
on reasonable grounds of suspicion on the basis of detailed summaries of evidence 
and intelligence material which describes not only the activities alleged against the 
individual and the sources of infonnation, but also the context of terrorism activities 
. 'd d I 236 m a WI er an very comp ex manner. 
Section 2 reads in the following: 
The Secretary of State may make such orders if: 
(a) he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual IS or has been 
involved in terrorism related activity and 
(b) considers that it is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of 
the public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on 
that individual 
Section 1(4) of the PTA 2005 provides an illustrative list of obligations, which include 
the following: 237 
i) restrictions on the possessiOn of specified articles or substances such as a 
mobile telephone 
ii) restrictions on the use of specified services or facilities such as internet access 
iii) restrictions on work and business arrangements 
235 A full hearing by the High Court or Session's Court and a right of appeal on a point of law from the 
decision of the said courts. 
236 First Report of the Independent Reviewer pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005, an independent review by Lord Carlile ofBerriew (2"d February 2006) at pp 11-12 
237 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Commentary on Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2005, (March 1, 
2005) at p. 3 
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iv) restrictions on association or communication with other individuals, specified 
or generally 
v) restrictions on where an individual may reside and who may be admitted to 
that place 
vi) a requirement to admit specified individuals to certain locations and to allow 
such places to be searched and items to be removed there from 
vii) a prohibition on an individual being in specified locations at specified time or 
days 
viii) restrictions to an individual's freedom of movement, including giving prior 
notice of proposed movements 
ix) a requirement to surrender the individuals passport 
x) a requirement to allow the individual to be photographed 
xi) a requirement to cooperate with surveillance of the individuals movement or 
communications, including electronic tagging 
xii) a requirement to report to a specified person and specified time and places 
The types of non-derogating control orders listed above have adverse effect on 
a terrorist suspect as it infringes a wide range of rights guaranteed under the 
Convention. 23 8 In fact Human Rights Watch disagrees with the Home Secretary's 
stand that these control orders are preventive, they are not, and it is observed that any 
fom1 of control orders listed above amounts to criminal sanction, which can only be 
imposed by competent judicial authority and not the Executive. 23 9 The justification is 
238 Human Rights Watch observes that these could range from rights arising under Article 5 right to 
liberty, Article 8 right to privacy, Article 10 freedom from expression and Article 11 freedom from 
association of the Convention. Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Commentary on Prevention of 
Tenorism Bill 2005 (March 1, 2005) at p.3 
239 !bid 
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further reinforced by the fact that a breach of control order amounts to a criminal 
offence.240 
Further there is a danger as to the standard of proof required under the PTA 
2005, which only requires a reasonable suspicion by the Secretary of State. Clearly, a 
higher standard of proof is required, akin to the standard in criminal law, which is 
beyond reasonable doubt. 24 1 An offence of such magnitude in the instance, surely 
requires a higher standard of proof and not otherwise, as the Human Rights Watch 
observes that even the imposition of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders require the 
criminal standard ofproofdespite being civil in nature.242 
It is disturbing that a citizen's liberty lies at the hands of the Executive rather 
than a judge in relation to non-derogating control orders. This must surely be regarded 
as the biggest threat to civil liberties in the UK for more than 300 years243 and as the 
UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights observes: 
"Parliament should take a long view and resist temptation to grant 
powers to governments ' which compromise the rights and liberties of 
individuals. The situations which may appear to justify the granting of 
such powers are temporary-the loss of freedom is often permanent. "244 
240 Section 9 PTA 2005 
241 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 
242 The Human Rights Watch in reference to the case of Clingham v Kensington and Ch elsea LBC and 
R (McCann and others) v Manchester Crown Court [2002] UKHL 39. Human Rights Watch 
Briefing Paper, Conm1entary on Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2005 (March 1, 2005) at p.3 
243 BBC News, Q&A: Terror law row explained (http://news.bbc.co.uk/ l/hi/uk politics/4288407.stm), 
March 12, 2005 
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5.5.2 Safeguards: A Reflection of the Presumption of Innocence 
Although section 2(1) of the PTA 2005 operate to the detriment of terrorist 
suspects as they may be subject to control orders listed under section 1 (4) of the PTA 
2005 based on reasonable suspicion, however, there are safeguards which reflect the 
presumption of innocence under the PTA 2005 
5.5.2.1 Supervision of the Court 
The PTA 2005 provides within its scheme, a system of review by the court, 
which is reflected in section 3 of the PTA 2005 in relation to non-derogating control 
orders. It requires that in non-urgent cases, the permission of the court should be first 
obtained before a control order is made, and only in urgent cases for the confirmation 
of the order. Further, the cou1i is empowered under section 3 (1 2) of the PTA 2005 to 
make the following: quash the order, to quash one or more obligations imposed by the 
order, or to give directions to the Secretary of State for the revocation of the order or 
for the modification of the obligations imposed by the order. 245Surely, this 
mechanism of supervision adopted under the PTA 2005 provides far better protection 
for a suspected terrorist as it allows for control orders to be challenged. 
244 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Second Report "Anti-Tenorism, Crime and Security Bill," 
November 6, 2001, para 76 
245 First Report of the Independent Reviewer pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Tenorism 
Act 2005, an independent review by Lord Carlile ofBeniew (2"d February 2006) at p. 15 
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However, the scope of judicial review is to some extent limited, as the court is 
only empowered to determine the scope of the exercise of power by the Home 
Secretary and does not have the mandate to substitute its own findings with that of the 
Home Secretary. Further, the review of evidence by the court is subject to the nature 
of the evidence before hand, which may be deemed, classified. 246Therefore, although 
control orders can be challenged, the court however in considering whether the 
proceedings of the case should be conducted in open or closed hearing, must first take 
into account the nature of the evidence before hand. As such, in most cases, when 
national security is pleaded, it is a closed hearing that the courts would precede. In 
such circumstances, the controlled person and his choice of legal representative are 
excluded from the closed session and a Special Advocate would therefore represent, 
although not responsible to the controlled person.247 This is a replicate of the system 
used in the SIAC. 
The use of torture or other methods of oppression may have tainted the secret 
evidence obtained by the Government to substantiate its claim on reasonable grounds. 
Further, such evidence are usually regarded as classified material and subject to non-
disclosure, which means only one thing, that there is a grave challenge to the 
presumption of innocence and as Lord Scott observes; "indefinite imprisonment in 
consequence of a denunciation on grounds that are not disclosed and made by the 
person whose identity cannot be disclosed is the stuff ofnightmares."248 
246 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Commentary on Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2005 (March 1, 
2005) at p.4 
247 !d. 5 
248 A (FC) and Others (FC) (Appellants) v Secretmy of State for the Home department (Respondent); X 
(FC) and another (FC) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) 
[2004] UKHL 56, at para 155 
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Further, there is a clear violation of fundamental rights accorded to the 
controlled person who is put in a predicament as to the progress of his case. This is 
apparent especially when the controlled person is unable to have any form of 
discussion as to the evidence against him or give any form of instmctions to the 
Special Advocate. 249 It is humbly opined that although Lord Carlile may find in 
practical tenns control orders to have an effective protection for national securit/50 
and that to some degree be modified,251 but in reality control orders are made in the 
absence of full disclosure of evidence. Therefore, a person subject to a control order 
might never know the basis of the Home Secretary's reasonable suspicion of the 
suspect's involvement in the alleged terrorist activity. This therefore makes any 
challenge to the lawfulness of the orders very difficult. 252 
Finally, although the control order may only last for 12 months,253 it may be 
renewed if the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary for the order to 
continue in force for purposes connected with protecting members of public from a 
risk of terrorism, and that any obligations imposed by the renewed order are necessary 
for purposes cmmected with preventing or restricting involvement by the controlled 
person in terrorism related activity. 254 Such indefinite renewal potentially infringes 
the presumption of innocence. Any form of restriction on liberty following conviction 
upon the full vigour of the law is justified, but not in the instance! As Human Rights 
249 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Commentary on Prevention ofTenorism Bill 2005, (March 1, 
2005) at p. 5 
25° First Report of the Independent Reviewer pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005, an independent review by Lord Carlile ofBeniew (2"d February 2006) at p. 9 
251 Section 7 provides for the modification, notification and proof of orders to which the suspect on the 
basis of a change of circumstances affecting the order may apply for revocation or modification of 
the obligation imposed by the order which the Secretary of State has a statutory duty to consider 
pursuant to subsection 2 but such orders are not permitted to be upgraded from a non derogating to a 
derogating order. 
252 Human Rights Watch Briefmg Paper, Commentary on Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2005, (March 1, 
2005) at p. 5 
253 Section 2( 4) and pursuant to subsection ( 5) provides that a non derogating control order must states 
when it will cease to have effect. Contrast section 4(8) which deals with derogating control orders 
that will last only six months 
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Watch observes, the restriction imposed under a control order are not for a period 
pending trial but are an alternative to it, renewable indefinitely and without proper due 
c: d . I 255 process sa1eguar s m p ace. 
5.6 Right to Counsel under Anti-Terrorism Laws 
The right to counsel is regarded as one of the fundamental rights accorded to an 
accused person and as Hodgson J in R v SamueP56 states; 
'Perhaps the most important right given (or rather renewed) to a 
person detained by the police is his right to obtain legal advise. '257 
The Right to counsel is reflected under the Convention pursuant to Article 6258 and 
under section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984259 (hereinafter the 
'PACE 1984'). The provisions of the right to counsel are comprehensively phrased 
and anticipate all possible circumstances.260 The suspect should be told of his right to 
254 Section 2(6) of the PTA 2005 
255 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, Commentary on Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2005, (March 1, 
2005) at pp. 6-7 
256 [1988] Q.B.615 
257 !d. 241 
258 Article 6(3)(c) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to defend 
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choice or, if he has not sufficient means to 
pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interest of justice so requires. 
259 The recommendations made by the Philips Royal Commission (Philips Report) was broadly adopted 
by the Act, the provision reads: A person atTested and held in custody in a police station or other 
premises shall be entitled, if he so requests, to consult a solicitor privately at ay time, and Code C, 
paragraph 6.1 (As revised in April 1995) provides: 'Subject to the provisos in Annex B all people in 
police detention must be informed that they may at any time consult and cornnmnicate privately, 
whether in person, in writing or by telephone with a solicitor, and that independent legal advise is 
available free of charge from the duty solicitor.' 
260 The right extends to inc lude a person at police station voluntarily (Code C, note lA); juvenile or 
menta lly handicapped or disordered in the former the detainee himself and the following latter thru 
an appropriate adult (Code C, para. 3.13); and terrorist which was introduced following the Report of 
Lord Jellicoe, review of the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 
Cnmd. 8803 (1983), paras. 108- 110 and in Northern Ireland by virtue of the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency provisions) Act ! 987, Artic le 15 
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have a counsel on arrival at the police station261 and the custody officer must act on a 
request for a legal advice without delay. 262 In terrorism cases263 a suspect is allowed 
to see a solicitor within 48 hours from the time of his arrest and not from the time of 
arrival at the police station. 264 The Code265 further provides that police stations 
advertise the right to legal advice in posters prominently displayed in the charging 
area, which is rarely the case in Malaysia. 
The only possible delay is when the suspect is being questioned for a serious 
atTestable offence266 and if the case comes within the ambit of section 58(8) of the 
PACEA 1984 and Annex B of Code C, which specifies two additional grounds for 
delaying access to legal advise for terrorism suspects; namely where there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that it will lead to interference with the gathering of 
information about the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; or 
by alerting any person, wi 11 make it more difficult to prevent an act of terrorism or to 
secure the apprehension or conviction of someone for a terrorist offence. 267 
Such comprehensive and detailed rules pertaining to the exercise of delay of 
the right to counsel in the English legal system are never envisaged within our 
Malaysian legal system. In fact the Home Secretary states that the only reason for 
delaying access to a legal adviser relates to the risk that he would either intentionally 
26 1 Although section 58 does not directly deal with this point, but it does state that a person is entitled to 
exercise the right if he has been anested and is held in a police station. Michael Zander, The Police 
& Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 3'd Edi, Sweet & Maxwell (1995) at p 126 
'6' 
- - Code para. 6.5 
263 For ordinary cases, a suspect must be allowed a solicitor as soon as practicable (section 58 (4) of the 
PACEA 1984) and in any event must be allowed within 36 hours (section 58 (5) of the PACEA /984) 
264 Section 58 (13)(a) of the PACEA /984 
265 Code para 6.3 
266 Defined in section 116 and Schedule 5 of the PA CEA 1984 
267 Delay has to be authorised by an officer of the rank of superintendent. It can only be authorised 
where he has reasonable grounds for believing that the exercise of the right: 
(a) will lead to interference with or harm to evidence connected with a serious arrestable offence 
or interference with or physical injury to other persons; or 
(b) will lead to the alerting off other persons suspected of having committed such an offence but 
not yet arrested for it; or 
(c) will hinder the recovery of any property obtained as a result of such an offence 
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or inadvertently convey information to confederates still at large that would undercut 
an investigation in progress. What a suspect's legal adviser says to him can never be a 
ground for delaying a consultation between them, nor can anxiety about what the legal 
adviser might say to the suspect. Delay can be authorised only on the basis of what 
the legal adviser may do once the consultation has been completed. 268The courts 
therefore, treat breach of section 58 of the PACEA 1984 as a serious matter of law, 
which may even warrant a conviction being quashed. 269 The right to counsel therefore 
is regarded as a fundamental right under the Convention, 270 applying in both trial and 
0 l d" 271 pre-tna procee mgs. 
In Murray v United Kingdom,272 the court held that in light of the 
circumstances of this case,273 counsel's presence is demanding and crucial and to 
exclude him during questioning constituted a clear violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention.274 The court further held that where domestic legislation pem1its such 
268 House of Commons, Hansard, Standing Committee E, Feb. 2, 1984, Col. 1417 
269 In R v Samuel [1988] Q.B.615, the Court of Appeal quashed a 10-year prison sentence because the 
police had refused the suspect access to a solicitor under section 58(8) on the ground that there was a 
risk that giving the suspect the access to a solicitor would result in accomplices being alerted. The 
Court held that the right to access to a solicitor was 'a fundamental right off a citizen'. A mere 
believe that a solicitor might alert other suspects is not enough a justification to warrant a denial as 
they had to believe that it would be very probable that the solicitor either would commit the criminal 
offence of alerting other suspects or do so inadvertently or unwillingly. 
270 In DiStefano v United Kingdom [1989] 60 D.R. 182, the lawyer made a bail application on behalf of 
the accused person, and though there were may consultations during the lengthy period before his 
trial nevertheless were denied at the earlier stage of investigation The commission noted that an 
accused person's right to communicate freely with a lawyer cannot be said to be insusceptible of 
restriction, and that the general principle of fairness under Article 6 should be the guiding criterion. 
The comparatively short period, during which the applicant was prevented from seeing his lawyer, 
after charge, was held not to violate either Article 6(3) (b) or Article 6(3) (c). 
271 The Court in lmbroscia v Switzerland [1994] 17 E.H.R.R. 441 held that the right to counsel is not 
only relevant during trial but extends to cover pre trial proceedings. Here the Court held that the 
failure on the police and the prosecution to notify the defence counsel of the interrogations with the 
result that the applicant was questioned in their absence was however remedied when the counsel did 
attend the final interview and made no objection to the record of the previous interviews. 
272 [1996] 22 E.H.R.R 29, the decision in Murray was accepted with full force by the government and 
reflected this decision in the passing of the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998 
and the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
273 The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 permits the drawing of adverse inference 
from a defendant's failure to answer questions in the police station, and /or failure to testify at trial. 
See similar provision under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 34-37. 
274 Murray was anested under the Prevention ofTerrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and whilst 
being interviewed he stated repeatedly that he had nothing to say, therefore inadvertently exercising 
81 
drawing of inferences from a decision of not answering questions in an interview, the 
right of access to solicitor is of paramount importance. Therefore any substantial 
delay on any ground will breach the right to a fair trial even though it was carried out 
lawfully. 275 
However, with the passing of the ATCSA 2001 and the PTA 2005, the right to 
counsel has to some extent been curtailed. This is apparent as suspected ten·orist and 
his choice of legal representative are excluded from closed hearings and is replaced 
by a trained and independent lawyer described as a Special Advocate. It is emphasised 
that the Special Advocate appointed is not responsible to the person whose interest he 
represents and does not have a duty to take any instruction from the suspect or even 
discuss evidence or grounds for decision. This is a clear violation of fundamental due 
process enshrined in the Convention and PACEA 1984 as making a challenge to the 
lawfulness of the order becomes difficult as the person subject to the order may not be 
able to defend his case with the counsel of his choice. 
his right of silence without any advise whatsoever from his counsel as counsel was only allowed 
after 48 hours and in subsequent interviews thereafter he stated that he was advised by his counsel to 
remain silent. Dming several interviews that lasted for 21 hours and 39 minutes over two days, these 
were the only statement made by the applicant. 
275 /d. 66, the court held that the concept of fairness enshrined in Article 6 requires that the accused has 
the benefit of the assistance of a lawyer. . . at the initial stage of police interrogation. To deny access 
to a lawyer for the first 48 hours of police questioning, in a situation where the rights of the defence 
may well be irretrievably prejudiced, is-whatever the justification for such denial-incompatible with 
the rights of the accused under Article 6. 
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It is therefore observed that both the ATCSA 2001 and the PTA 2005 were 
enacted in light of recent events of terrorist attacks. It is clear that indefinite detention 
of foreign persons is discriminatory in nature and a clear violation of the presumption 
of innocence. Although the ATCSA 2001 provides an opportunity for detainees to be 
heard in a special tribunal, it is still far convincing as an effective safeguard as it may 
exclude detainees and their legal representatives from closed proceedings when 
classified evidence are reviewed. 
Further, the control order under the PTA 2005 is a mere superimposed and 
masquerading indefinite detention under the ATCSA 2001 as both measures are a form 
of detention order, which operate to curtail the liberty of the accused person in its own 
way. Although the PTA 2005 is subject to judicial supervision, however, it lacks 
effectiveness. The control order is made on the basis of reasonable suspicion, founded 
on secret evidence not disclosed to the suspect and determined not by the judiciary but 
by politicians. Although it is observed that the justification for control orders is to 
secure the safety of the State by the minimum measures needed to ensure effective 
disruption and prevention of terrorist activity,276 nevertheless, it is without doubt that 
such measure impose hardship to a suspected terrorist as wide range of rights such as 
the right to privacy and freedom from expression are curtailed.177 
Although the sunset clause under the PTA 2005 relating to control orders is 
due to expire 12 months since the Act was passed, 278 however, there are strong 
anticipation that the Home Secretary may seek to extend the powers subject to 
276 First Report of the Independent Reviewer pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Tenorism 
Act 2005 , an independent review by Lord Carlile ofBeniew (2"d February 2006) 
277 Amnesty International Press Release, The Prevention of Terrorism Bill: A Grave Threat to Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law in the UK (28 February 2005) 
(http://web.amnesty.org/Iibrary/index/engeur450052005) 
278 1Oth March 2006 
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approval of both Houses for the next commg year279 or at least until the new 
Terrorism Bill 2005 is passed.280 It is alarming that the government of England and 
Wales seem to actively campaign for a 90 days detention under the proposed 
Terrorism Bill. 281 The justification for a 90-day is based on the fact that it would 
allow comprehensive and detailed forensic testing and questioning of the 
suspect.282However this was rejected and compromised to 28 days detention 
period. 283If the proposed detention period had passed the report stage, this would have 
meant that suspects arrested under mere suspicion of having conducted, or being 
engaged in planning, terrorist crimes could be held for such lengthy periods, far more 
than allowed under section 7 3 of the !SA 1960284 before being charged with a 
. 285 
cnme. 
5. 7 Conclusion 
It is concluded that a nation which has constantly upheld the rule of law and 
where its common law approach to national security matters are exemplary,286 so 
much so that it was applied to some extent by the courts in Commonwealth 
279 LIBERTY, Protecting Civil Liberties, Promoting Human Rights: Summary of the Prevention of 
Tenm·ism Act 2005 (www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk) 
280 The Terrorism Bill was introduced on October 12, 2005 and currently in Parliament's progress 
281 The Terrorism Act 2000 allows a maximum of 14 days detention 
282 Andy Hayman, Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police wrote on October 6, 2005 to the 
Home Secretary that 90 days detention was necessary in the following: The networks are invariably 
international, indeed global in their origin and span of operation. Enquiries have to be undertaken in 
many different jurisdictions, many of which are not able to operate to tight timescales; the forensic 
requirements in modem tenorist cases are far more complex and time consuming than in the past and 
a feature of major counter terrorist investigations has been that one firm of solicitors will frequently 
represent most of the suspects. This leads to delay in the investigative process because of the 
requirement for consultations with multiple clients among others. For further reading see: 
http: / /security .homeoffice .gov. uk/news-and-publ ications I /publication-search/legislation-
fublications/met-letter?view=Binary 
28 The amendment was proposed by David Winnick MP 
(http: //www. publicwhip.org. uk/dividion. php?date=2005-11 -09&numbei= 85) 
284 Section 73 provides a maximum of 60 days 
285 http://www.publications.parliament.uklpa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/5 15/51 011 088 .htrn 
286 Malik Imtiaz Sarwar & Christopher Leong Sau Foo, National Security & Fundamental Liberties : 
Are the Courts Striking the Right Balance? 11'11 Malaysian Law Conference (8-10 November 2001) 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, at p. 50 
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countries, 287 is today no longer regarded as a model of human rights culture. The 
passing of the ATCSA 2001, the PTA 2005 and the proposed Terrorism Bill are 
evidences of a new trend emerging from the Westminster Parliament disregarding 
fundamental rights and liberties. 
Although much has been said of the chilling effect of such laws, nevertheless, 
it provides effective safeguards as compared to the !SA 1960. These laws are subject 
to immense scrutiny by both the Houses before being adopted as an Act of Parliament 
and are subject to review by a court of law when questions of incompatibility under 
the Convention on Human Rights are raised.288 It is further observed that whenever 
English judges are faced with questions of terrorism laws, they take a forceful 
approach in upholding fundamental rights and liberties of an accused person. 
However, it is submitted that although the safeguards offered to an accused person 
under such laws are comparatively far effective as offered to an !SA detainee, 
nevertheless, it remains that the scope of judicial review is always curtailed to some 
degree when determining the merit of the imposition of control orders. The accused 
may never get a right to be tried by an independent and impartial court, with a counsel 
of his choice, and full access to all evidence against him to mount a successful 
challenge. 
287 The Federal Court of Malaysia in the case of Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, 
Malaysia [ 1969] 2 MLJ 129 applied the decision of the House of Lords in Liversidge v Anderson 
ri942] AC 206 
28El See the case of A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) [2004] UKHL 56 
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CHAPTER6 
CONCLUSION 
"Be the change that you want to see in the world"289 
The government of all nations seem to refuse to acknowledge a basic truth; 
punishment without trial is unacceptable, no matter what. Placing limitations such as 
curtailing the presumption of innocence, which fashions due process is an option 
avai lable under these anti-terrorism laws, but it won't address the culmination of the 
breakdown of law and order in failing to observe due process of law. The presumption 
of innocence is regarded as the cornerstone of the criminal justice system and a 
central safeguard embraced under due process, which if not observed, may only lead 
to a victory for intolerance and injustice. The presumption of innocence as such, is 
accorded universal recognition and finds its place at the heart of the legal 
jurisprudence of Malaysia, and England and Wales vide the Federal Constitution and 
the Convention. 
However it is evident that this majestic safeguard has been curtailed to great 
extent under anti -terrorism laws, which empower the Executive to order indefinite 
detention orders under the !SA 1960, ATCSA 2001 and control orders under the PTA 
2005. Further such laws may effectively delay or even deny an accused right to 
counsel or can even exclude the choice of legal representative of the accused. It is 
reiterated that any fom1 of restriction on the liberty of an accused person is not for the 
Executive to decide, but for the judiciary, through full vigour of the criminal process. 
289 Mahatma Gandhi 
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As recent events of terrorist attacks have greatly influenced world leaders to 
push for further restrictive anti-terrorism laws that has far reaching consequences and 
in Malaysia with the justification that the !SA 1960 is a necessary tool to counter 
terrorism, the need for judicial safeguards and adherence to fundamental rights of due 
process becomes apparent. Comparatively, both Malaysia and England and Wales 
share similarities as both Govenm1ents had fought terrorism in the past, and as such 
have abundance of terrorism laws to curb the current global threat without the need 
for further legi.slation. 
However, despite such laws, the Goverrunent of England and Wales 
introduced new anti-terrorism measures and a new lease of life was given to the !SA 
1960 in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 attack. 290 However, comparatively, 
although the ATCSA 2001, the PTA 2005291 and the !SA 1960 provide within its 
scheme; preventive detentions, anti-terrorism laws passed by the Goverrm1ent of 
England and Wales provide far effective safeguards in preserving the presumption of 
innocence under such laws, as compared to the !SA 1960 of Malaysia. 
The !SA 1960 unlike the PTA 2005 provides no recourse for judicial review, 
and therefore deprives a person's liberty indefinitely without trial solely for 
preventive reasons. Further, both the Advisory Board and the SIAC may exclude a 
detainee and their legal representative when classified evidence are reviewed, 
however, in relation to a detainee under the ATCSA 2001 he may lodge an appeal to a 
court on the lawfulness of the derogation and hence the detention itself. Further, the 
Advisory Board as compared to the SIAC does not effectively discharge its duty as a 
body of review. Although the powers under the !SA 1960 in relation to police 
290 The post September 11 attack had extended the use of the ISA to religion and militant activist's 
prominently over three distinct groups: The KMM, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and all those who had ties 
with the Madrassah Luqmanul Hakiem in Ulu Tiram, Johor. Human Rights Watch, Background: The 
ISA in Law and Practice (www.hrw.org) 
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detention is now subject to judicial review, nevertheless, much is left desired as 
Ministerial detention orders still fall outside the scope of judicial review. The PTA 
2005 on the other hand is subject to judicial supervision but it lacks effectiveness. The 
control order is made on the basis of reasonable suspicion, founded on secret evidence 
not disclosed to the suspect and determined not by the judiciary but by politicians. 
As such these anti-terrorism law no matter what safeguards they envisage, 
significantly erode the presumption of innocence. This is where the judiciary's role as 
the 'ultimate bulwark' and protector of individual rights and freedom become apparent 
as it is the principle of law that every man is declared innocent until he is pronounced 
by a competent court of law to be guilty. The duty of keeping a fine balance between 
the interest of society and that of the individual is entrusted to the Judiciary. In the 
words of the former Chief Justice of India, PN Bhagwati; the task in a democracy 
governed by the rule of law is entrusted to the judiciary and it is the judiciary, which 
has to find a dividing line so as to harmonize the two interests without over 
emphasizing one to the detriment of the other.Z92 
However, comparatively the Malaysian Judiciary should take cognisance of 
the English Court's decision to be stalwarts of fundamental liberties. Despite the tum 
of events which lead to the curtailment of judiciary's power of review under the !SA 
1960 paralleled by unsatisfactory judicial ruling of the court, its time that the judiciary 
restore their image as guardians of civil liberties by shifting the pendulum in favour of 
protecting the rights of an accused person arrested under such laws regarded as 
d . . 293 racoman m nature. 
291 Although the PTA 2005 provides for control orders, these can taken as preventive in nature 
292 Kumarappa-Lecture delivered at the TAT A Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay, on 23 February 
1985. Also found in Noorjahan Baya, Human Rights and Criminal Justice Administration of fndia 
(2000) New Delhi, Upal Publishing House at p 11-12. 
293 Tun Salleh Abas in Lim Kit Siang v Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad [1987] 1 MLJ at p3 87 held 
that it is therefore the courts, who are the final arbiter between the individual and the state and in 
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Respect for the presumption of innocence in State governance and law 
enforcement is the only sure way of ensuring public confidence and support as we 
move forward towards a develop and progress nation. For that reason, it is essential 
that the principles of the UDHR 1948 should be observed and respected in State 
governance and law enforcement. This would fulfil the promise of our Proclamation 
of Independence. Although the presumption of innocence is embedded under Article 5 
(I) of the Federal Constitution, however such rights arising under the provision may 
never stand the test of time, especially with the growing number of anti-terrorism laws 
passed. Therefore an imperative call for change is warranted in light of the above 
discussed. 
Some forms of recommendations in the following are therefore proposed: 294 
1. A Constitutional Court to hear such matters and modelled within the framework of 
the European Court of Human Rights. The composition of the court should 
include Federal Court judges, or 
2. An independent specialised tribunal is proposed. The composition of the tribunal 
should include the same as abovementioned. 
3. The Human Rights Commission should be empowered to hear infringements of 
such fundamental rights 
4. Effective right to counsel during police detention295 
5. Empower the Advisory board with powers to order release of detainees 
6. Strengthen the scope of judicial review, including the app lication of habeas corpus 
performing their constitutional role, the courts must of necessity and strictly in accordance with the 
Constitution and the law be the ultimate bulwark against unconstitutional legislation 's or excesses in 
administrative action. 
294 Note: These recommendations are specifica lly in reference to the !SA I 960 and there has been 
abundance of recomn1endations proposed since the inception of the /SA 1960, notable ones include 
recommendations made by the Human Rights Watch, for further reading see: Human Rights Watch, 
Vol. 16, No 7 (c), at pp. 54-55 
295 The Bar Council recommends that all person be given the right to immediate legal representation 
upon detention. Roy Rajasingham, Vice Chairman, Bar Council. Press Statement 31 May, 2001 
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7. Set up a Parliamentary Select Committee, quite similar to the one under the 
ACTSA 2001 which would allow Parliament to scrutinise any potential abuse of 
power by the Executive 
8. To educate law enforcement agencies as to the importance of observing human 
rights in the course of discharging their duties 
9. To allow a judicial officer to conduct random checks on !SA detainees so as to 
avoid any concealment of threats and physical abuse by enforcement authorities 
Such measures are proposed in light of the facet of obscurity in the criminal 
justice system in light of anti-terrorism Jaws. Such laws reduce these constitutional 
safeguards to pious platitudes with no legal effect, leaving the road to tyranny open.296 
It is therefore emphasised that until recourse to trial is made available to detainees 
under preventive detention, the issue as to guilt or innocence would remain largely in 
doubt. 297 
Preventive detentions and control orders, by their very nature challenge and 
undem1ine the presumption of innocence and this was evident with the Belmarsh 
detainees. 298 Kate Allen the director of Amnesty International in meeting the two 
detainees299 said that both men expressed profound sense of injustice that their liberty 
had been taken from them without ever being charged, tried or shown any evidence 
against them."300 However desired, the justification accorded by the Executive is that 
296 Jerald Gomez Advocate and Solicitor High Court of Malaya. Rights of Accused person - Are 
safeguards Being Reduced? Paper presented at the It" Malaysian law Conference held in Kuala 
Lumpur from I ot"- It" December 2003 
297 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Security: Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses under 
Malaysia 's Internal Security Act, May 2004, Vol.l6, No.7( c) p 52 
298 A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) 
[2004] UKHL 
299 Palestinjan Mahmoud Abu Rideh and an Algerian man known as 'H ' 
300 Nigel Morris, Home Affairs Correspondent, Enerrues of the State? Police fail even to question men 
held as a terror threat, Suspected of plotting terror, a group of men have been held for four years but 
never charged. Now, in their first testimorues, they reveal the authorities have not even questioned 
them since their arrest. 
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such measures are necessary to combat terrorism and in the words of learned Ramdas 
Tikamdas; the Executive would justify such laws as a necessity to defend freedom but 
the record of its use, rather misuse, in recent history betrays the fact that the so-called 
cure can be indistinguishable from the disease. 301 
Thus, the administration of criminal justice system encompasses that an 
accused person is well protected from arbitrary powers of the State and one such 
safeguard is the presumption of innocence. This right to be presumed innocent 
however under anti-terrorism laws to a large extent has been curtailed for the sake of 
protecting the security of the State. This right should never be compromised! It is 
emphasised that there must be a wi llingness on the part of the government to 
recognise that absolute disregard to fundamental rights would only lead to potential 
abuse of powers as absolute power in the absence of effective safeguard only lead to 
absolute decay of democratic and civil society. 
(15 December 2005) 
(http:/ /news. independent. co. uk/uk/legaVarticle33 3 25 8 .ece) 
30 1 Ramdas Tikamdas, National Security and Constitutional Rights-The Internal Security Act 1960. 
(www.malaysianbar.org.my) 
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